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IN THE SUPREME COURT OP THE STATE OP UTAH
LEANNA BROADWATER,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
Case No. 900508
vs.
OLD REPUBLIC SURETY, a Wisconsin
corporation doing business in
Utah, NORTHWESTERN NATIONAL
INSURANCE COMPANY OF MILWAUKEE,
WISCONSIN, a Wisconsin corporation doing business in Utah,
ATLAS STOCK TRANSFER, a Utah
corporation, CHECK RITE
INTERNATIONAL INC., f/k/a
CARDINAL ENERGY CORPORATION,
and SCOTT J. FLETCHER, a Utah
resident,

Priority No. 16

Defendants-Appellants.
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND CASE HISTORY
Jurisdiction lies with this court pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2-2(3) (j) (Supp. 1991).

Defendants bring this appeal from the

June 6, 1990 order by the Third Judicial District of Salt Lake
County, the Honorable Raymond S. Uno presiding, granting partial
summary judgment in favor of plaintiff, Leanna Broadwater, and
denying

defendants

Old

Republic

Surety, Northwestern

National

Insurance Company, Atlas Stock Transfer, and Check Rite International, Inc.'s motion for partial summary judgment.

Defendants

also bring this appeal from the September 17, 1990 order awarding
attorney's fees to plaintiff.

Both orders were certified as final

orders, pursuant to Rule 54(b), U.R.C.P., on October 19, 1990.
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Did the trial court err in granting plaintiff's motion

and denying defendants' motion for partial summary judgment on
Counts I and II of plaintiff's amended complaint?
Standard of Review
In considering an appeal from a grant of summary judgment,
this Court views the facts in a light most favorable to the losing
party below.

In determining whether those facts require, as a

matter of law, the entry of judgment for the prevailing party
below, this

Court

gives

no

deference

to

the

trial

court's

conclusions of law, which are reviewed for correctness. Blue Cross
and Blue Shield v. State, 779 P.2d 634 (Utah 1989).
2.

Did the trial court err in holding as a matter of law

that plaintiff's damages, if any, under Counts I and II of her
amended complaint should be determined as of August 4, 1988?
Standard of Review
Since summary judgment is granted as a matter of law rather
than fact, this Court is free to reappraise the trial court's legal
conclusions. Barber v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 751 P.2d 748 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988) .
3.

Did the trial court err in awarding plaintiff her

attorney's fees, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (Supp.
1991), on Counts I and II of her amended complaint?

2
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Standard of Review
Since a summary judgment is granted as a matter of law rather
than fact, this Court is free to reappraise the trial court's legal
conclusion.

Barber v. Farmers Ins. Exch.. 751 P.2d 748 (Utah Ct.

App. 1988).

In order to award attorney's fees under § 78-27-56,

the court must determine that "the action or defense to the action
was without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith . . . ."
Id. The determination of "without merit" is a question of law, and
therefore this Court reviews it for correctness.

Jeschke v.

Willis, 811 P.2d 202, 203-04 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).

The deter-

mination of "lack of good faith" is synonymous with the finding of
"bad faith."

A finding of bad faith is a question of fact and is

reviewed by this Court under the clearly erroneous standard, id.
at 204.
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES
Rule 56(c) and (e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56

(Supp. 1991) are the determinative

authorities on appeal. The texts of Rule 56(c) and (e) , U.R.C.P.,
and Utah Code Ann § 78-27-56 (Supp. 1991), are set forth in their
entirety, infra.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff-respondent Leanna Broadwater claims to be a bona
fide purchaser of 8,000 shares of stock in Cardinal Energy Corp.
("Cardinal"), now known as Check Rite International, Inc. ("Check
Rite")

(R. 311)

Sometime prior to May 4, 1988, plaintiff

3
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presented those 8,000 shares of Cardinal stock, reflected by
Certificate No. 258, to defendant Atlas Stock Transfer Company
("Atlas") and requested that said shares be transferred into her
name in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 70A-8-306 (1953),

(Id.)

This appeal arise out of the alleged wrongful refusal of Atlas and
Check Rite to transfer the subject shares into plaintiff's name.
The 8,000 shares of stock in dispute were originally purchased
on or about August 23, 1982, by defendant Scott J. Fletcher
("Fletcher").

(R. 71)

During the period of time Fletcher owned

the stock, he informed Atlas, the stock transfer agent of Cardinal,
that Certificate No. 258 had been lost or stolen.

(R. 72)

In

order to obtain a replacement certificate, Fletcher was required to
obtain a lost instruments bond in accordance with Utah Code Ann. §
70A-8-405(2)(b)

(1953).

Fletcher eventually

obtained a lost

instruments bond on November 23, 1982 from Northwestern National
Insurance Company, the predecessor in interest of Old Republic
Surety Company ("Old Republic").

(R. 73, 107) After tendering the

lost instruments bond to Atlas, Atlas issued Fletcher a new
certificate, Certificate No. 676, representing 8,000 shares of
Cardinal stock.

(Id.) Subsequently, Atlas placed a stop transfer

order on Certificate No. 258.

(R. 77)

Apparently unknown to Fletcher, plaintiff on or before May 4,
1988, presented the previously lost Certificate No. 258 to Atlas
for transfer.

(R. 77, 311)

Due to the existence of the stop

transfer order on Certificate No. 258, Atlas refused to transfer

4
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and register the subject shares in accordance with plaintiff's
instructions.

(R. 77, 111)

Plaintiff was promptly notified of

Atlas' refusal to transfer her stock by a letter of May 4, 1988
from Atlas.

(R. 11,

111)

At the time Atlas refused to transfer Certificate No. 258, May
4, 1988, there was no trading of Check Rite stock on which to base
a fair market price for such stock.

(R. 324-26)

However, over the

course of the next several months, the trading price of Check Rite
stock fluctuated widely:
Date

Trading Price

May 1-7, 1988

*

May 8-14, 1988

*

May 15-21, 1988

*

May 22-28, 1988

*

May 29 - June 4, 1988

*

June 5-11, 1988

0.25

June 12-18, 1988

0.41

June 19-25, 1988

0.30

June 26 - July 2, 1988

0.40

July 3-9, 1988

0.38

July 10-16, 1988

0.40

July 17-23, 1988

0.65
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1.251

July 24-30, 1988

•Signifies no trading during this time period.
(R. 312, 324-26)
Following receipt of Atlas7 correspondence of May 4, 1988,
refusing plaintiff's requested transfer, plaintiff contacted Old
Republic.

(R. 77)

Old Republic received first notice of a

potential claim under its lost instruments bond on or about May 20,
1988.

(R. 519)

Plaintiff, by means of affidavit, asserted that

from May, 1988 until the filing of her suit on April 28, 1989,
plaintiff was "mistreated, misled, and 'lulled' by certain of the
defendants," specifically Old Republic.

(R. 389-92, 413-16)

Defendants denied any such wrongful conduct and submitted the
affidavit

of

Paul

S. Guardalabene

plaintiff's factual claims.
Following
register

the

contradict

and

refute

(R. 518-24)

defendants' continued
subject

to

shares

in

refusal to transfer and

accordance

with

plaintiff's

instructions, plaintiff brought suit on April 28, 1989.

(R. 2)

Plaintiff's amended complaint seeks damages in excess of $250,000
against the various defendants for alleged statutory wrongful
refusal to transfer, conversion, breach of implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing, breach of third-party beneficiary contract,
bad faith, aiding and abetting, negligence, violation of § 12(2) of
the 1933 Federal Securities Act, violation of § 61-1-22(1)(b) of

!

Plaintiff also submitted a conflicting affidavit claiming a
trading price of 1 5/16 as of July 28, 1988. (R. 388)
6
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the Utah Uniform Securities Act, fraud, and violation of the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO").
98-100)

(R.

Plaintiff's amended complaint also seeks attorney's fees

under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (Supp. 1991).

(R. 98)

Following brief discovery, the parties filed cross motions for
partial summary judgment on Counts I and II of plaintiff's amended
complaint for conversion and wrongful refusal to transfer of the
subject stock.

(R. 310-24, 352-78)

For purposes of the cross

motions for partial summary judgment, the parties assumed arguendo
that Atlas and Check Rite's actions were wrongful and constituted
a "conversion" of plaintiff's stock.

The parties' principal

dispute, therefore, was over the proper time for calculating
plaintiff's damages.

(R. 313)

In conjunction with defendants'

motion for partial summary judgment, defendants also moved to
strike various affidavits submitted by plaintiff in support of her
cross-motion

for

summary

judgment.

(R.

426-31,

609-12)

Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment also included a
prayer for an unspecified award of attorney's fees.

(R. 372)

Oral argument on the motions was heard before The Honorable
Raymond S. Uno on May 1, 1990.

On June 6, 1990, The Honorable

Raymond S. Uno, District Judge, entered an order granting partial
summary judgment in favor of plaintiff and against defendants,
finding that plaintiff's damages should be determined as of ninety
days after the conversion, when the Check Rite stock reached its
highest value after the conversion.

(R. 710-12)

The lower court
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also denied defendants' motion to strike the affidavits submitted
by plaintiff in support of her motion.

(Id.) The trial court also

initially took the matter of plaintiff's request for attorney fees
under advisement.

(R. 647, 710-12) Subsequently, on September 6,

the trial court entered judgment awarding plaintiff attorney's fees
in the amount of one-third of the principal judgment under Counts
I and II of her amended complaint.

(R. 818-19)

On October 19,

1991, the trial court directed that the judgments and orders
entered on July 6, 1990 and September 27, 1990, be certified as
final and appealable under Rule 54(b), U.R.C.P.

(R. 842-45)

Defendants now bring this appeal from the above-mentioned judgments
and orders.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In order for a court to grant plaintiff's motion for partial
summary judgment, plaintiff has to establish by competent evidence
that there were no genuine issues of material fact with respect to
each

and

every

element

of

plaintiff's

cause

conversion and wrongful refusal to transfer stock.

of

action

for

The principal

dispute between the parties in this case was over the proper time
for calculating plaintiff's damages for conversion and wrongful
refusal to transfer stock. Therefore, plaintiff has the burden of
establishing that there were no genuine issues of material fact
with respect to calculating plaintiff's damages within the 90-day
period of May 4, 1988, when the conversion occurred, and August 4,
1988, the date at which the trial court fixed the damages.

8
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Utah adheres to the "New York rule" which provides that
damages for the conversion of goods which fluctuate in value are
fixed at the highest market price the converted goods reach at any
time between the time the

injured party has notice of the

conversion and a "reasonable time" thereafter.

Although courts

have not uniformly applied the "New York rule", the overwhelming
majority of courts have held that a period of thirty days or less
constitutes a "reasonable time", as a matter of law, in which to
fix damages for the conversion of stock certificates.
The trial court, in finding ninety days to be a "reasonable
time" for fixing damages in this case

relied on disputed and

immaterial facts related to the alleged acts or omissions of Old
Republic.

By relying on such disputed and immaterial facts, the

trial court erred

in not holding

as a matter

of

law that

plaintiff's damages should be fixed at the highest price the
subject stock reached within thirty days of plaintiff learning of
the conversion.
The trial court also erred in awarding plaintiff attorney's
fees under Counts I and II of plaintiff's amended complaint. It is
well established that Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 requires that the
trial court make specific findings as to the determination of the
"merit" or "bad faith" of the nonprevailing party's action or
defense to the action.

In this case, the trial court made no

findings as to merit or bad faith when awarding plaintiff's
attorney's fees.

Furthermore, the record is devoid of any other

9
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basis to support the trial court's award of attorney's fees.
Therefore, the trial court erred in awarding attorney's fees to the
plaintiff.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT, FINDING
THAT A NINETY-DAY PERIOD WAS THE PROPER TIME
FOR CALCULATING PLAINTIFF'S DAMAGES.
A.

Utah Has Adopted the "New York Rule" to Fix Damages for the
Conversion of and Wrongful Refusal to Transfer Stock.
Count

I

of

plaintiff's

amended

complaint

alleges

that

defendants Atlas and Check Rite failed to fulfill their statutory
duty to effect a stock registration transfer requested by plaintiff
on or about May 4, 1988. Count II of plaintiff's amended complaint
alleges that the actions of Atlas and Check Rite tortiously
interfered with her right to control and possess those shares, and
thus constitute conversion.

Although plaintiff asserts separate

causes of action, courts generally treat the wrongful refusal to
transfer stock as an act of conversion.

F. Kristy and R. Appel,

The Transfer of Stock. § 271 (5th Ed. 1975).
general rule.

Utah follows that

See Cowan and Co. v. Atlas Stock Transfer Co., 695

P.2d 109, 112 (Utah 1984); Baalin v. Earl-Eagle Mining Co., 5 Utah
572, 184 P.2d 190, 194 (1919); Mundt v. Commercial National Bank of
Ogden, 35 Utah 90, 99 P.2d 454, 456 (1909).
The key dispute between the parties is over the proper time
for calculating plaintiff's damages for conversion and wrongful
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refusal to transfer stock•

As a general rule, the measure of

damages for conversion is the fair market value of the converted
goods at the time of conversion. See Murdock v, Blake, 26 Utah 2d
22, 484 P.2d 164 (1971); Lowe v. Rosenlof. 12 Utah 2d 190, 364 P.2d
418 (1961). However, most courts have adopted different rules for
determining damages when the fair market value of the converted
goods such as stocks, fluctuates widely. Approximately 10 states,
including Utah, have adopted the "New York rule," whereby converted
stock is valued at the highest market price of the stock between
the time the customer has notice of the conversion and a reasonable
time thereafter. This rule gives the stockholder a reasonable time
within which to decide whether to go into the marketplace and
replace the stock. The rule also gives the stockholder the option
of claiming the stock's market value at the time of conversion, to
afford him the basic remedy in a falling market.

On the other

hand, the New York rule also requires an injured party to mitigate
his damages, by not permitting the party to sit idly by while the
value of the converted stock rises.

Annot., 21 A.L.R.3d 1286,

1322-23 (1970).
The Utah Supreme Court adopted the New York rule in Western
Securities Co. v. Silver King Consolidated Mining Co., 57 Utah 88,
192 P. 664 (1920). In Western Securities, one Clark delivered more
than 29,000 shares of stock in the defendant corporation to the
corporation's officers, also party defendants, as collateral for
five promissory notes.

After Clark delivered the shares as
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collateral, the defendants sold the shares for $1,60 per share.
Over the next four months, the value of the shares increased to
more than $2.00 per share.

Plaintiff brought suit, claiming that

the defendants had wrongfully converted his stock.
entered for the plaintiff.

Judgment was

The Utah Supreme Court, in reversing

and remanding the lower court's judgment, clearly recognized and
adopted the New York rule:
The ordinary rule governing the measure of
damages in cases where the pledge wrongfully
converts the property pledged is the market
value of the property pledged with interest
from the time it was converted.
If the
pledged property consists of stocks or bonds
of a fluctuating market price, then the
measure of damages, under the New York rule,
is the highest market price of such stocks or
bonds within a reasonable time after the
pledgor obtained notice of the sale of the
stock or bonds which was illegally made. . . .
As soon as the pledgor receives notice that a
pledgee has converted his stocks or bonds, he
may go into the market and replace them, or,
if he chooses, he may rely on his damages. He
must, however, act within a reasonable time,
and cannot by his own will extend that
time. . . . Utah is one of the jurisdictions
wherein the New York rule has been adopted.
Western Securities, 192 P. at 672-3.

See also. Lake v. Pinder, 13

Utah 2d 76, 368 P.2d 593, 594 (1962) (In an action for failure to
deliver

stock,

court

recognized

that

the

aggrieved

party

is

entitled to be paid "the highest market value of such stock within
a reasonable time thereafter.11)
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Nephi Processing Plant,
Inc. v. Talbott,

247 F.2d 771

(10th Cir. 1957),

also recognized

12
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

that Utah adheres to the New York rule. In Nephi Processing Plant,
the court reviewed whether the trial court had erred in instructing
that the jury could award the highest price the converted good had
been sold for between the time of the conversion and a reasonable
time after plaintiffs obtained notice of the conversion.

In

sustaining the trial courts jury instruction, the Tenth Circuit
noted:
The Utah courts have recognized that as a
general rule the measure of damage for
conversion of property is the value of the
property at the time of the conversion, plus
interest. It has been held, however, that the
rule has no application where the converted
chattels are of a kind which have a
fluctuating market value. In such cases the
measure of damages is the highest market price
of the property within the reasonable time
after the owner has notice of the conversion.
The Utah Supreme Court has accepted this rule.
Western Securities Co. v. Silver King
Consolidated Mining Co., supra.
Id. at 774 (citations omitted).
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that Utah courts adhere to
the New York rule.

As a result, plaintiff was entitled only to

recover the highest value her stock reached within a "reasonable
time" of her learning of Atlas' refusal to transfer her shares.
B.

The Trial Court Erred in Ruling That a Ninety-day Period Was
a "Reasonable Time" to Fix Damages Under the New York Rule.
The determination of what is a "reasonable time" under the New

York rule for determining the value of stock has been held to be a
question of law to be determined by the trial court. See Mullin v.
J.J. Ouinlin & Co., 195 N.Y. 109, 87 N.E. 1078 (1909); Fullev v.

13
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Wasserman. 319 Pa. 420, 179 A, 595 (1935).

Utah courts also have

recognized that a "reasonable time" may be determined as a matter
of law.

In Pacific Development Co. v. Stewart, 113 Utah 403, 195

P.2d 748 (1948), the court reversed a judgment in favor of the
defendants in a lawful detainer action.

One of the principal

issues on appeal was whether the plaintiffs had permitted the
defendants a "reasonable time" in which to make up overdue payments
under a real estate contract.

In reversing the trial courts

judgment, the Utah Supreme Court held as a matter of law that 23
days' notice constituted a "reasonable time."

In so ruling, the

court stated, "Where the facts surrounding are undisputed, as they
are in this case, this court may determine, as a matter of law,
what is reasonable time." Pacific Development, 195 P.2d at 751.
The material facts surrounding the case at hand are also
undisputed.

On May 4, 1988, plaintiff was given notice of Atlas

and Check Rite's conversion of and wrongful refusal to transfer
Certificate No. 258 into plaintiff's name.

Atlas and Check Rite

continued to refuse to transfer and register the subject shares in
accordance with plaintiff's instructions from May to August, 1988.
During this time, the value of plaintiff's Check Rite stock
fluctuated widely. Since the material facts surrounding this case
were undisputed, the trial court could determine, as a matter of
law, what was a "reasonable time." The trial court, however, erred
in concluding that 90 days was a "reasonable time" in this case.
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1.

Thirty Days Rather Than Ninety Days Constituted a
"Reasonable Time" to Fix Damages Under the New York Rule,

Although courts have not recognized a single length of time as
the definitive standard for valuing converted stock under the New
York rule, the overwhelming majority of courts have held that a
period of 30 days or less constitutes a "reasonable time." Courts
holding that one month constitutes a reasonable time within the New
York rule include: Isonbercr v. Haupt, 235 A.D. 123, 256 N.Y.S. 411
(1932); Hamel v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 251 N.Y. 559, 168
N.E. 427 (1931); 0/Connor v. Graff, 186 A.D. 116, 173 N.Y.S. 730
(1919), aff'd., 230 N.Y. 552, 130 N.E. 890 (1920); Strickland v.
Magoun, 119 A.D. 113, 104 N.Y.S. 425 (1907), aff'd., 190 N.Y. 545,
83 N.E. 1132 (1907); and Burhorn v. Lockwood, 71 A.D. 301, 75
N.Y.S. 828 (1902), appeal dismissed, 177 N.Y. 539, 69 N.E. 1121
(1903), reh'g denied, 177 N.Y. 554, 69 N.E. 1121 (1903).
On at least two occasions, courts have construed two and a
half to three weeks to be a "reasonable time."

See Gelb v. Zimet

Bros., Inc., 34 Misc. 2d 401, 228 N.Y.S.2d 111 (1962), aff'd., 18
A.D.2d 967, 237 N.Y.S.2d 989 (1963); Rosenbaum v. Stiebel, 137 A.D.
912, 122 N.Y.S. 131 (1910).
The following courts have also construed periods of time less
than two weeks to be reasonable under the New York Rule: Citizen
Street R. Co. v. Robbinsf 144 Ind. 671, 42 N.E. 916 (1896), Supp.
Op., 144 Ind. 687, 43 N.E. 649 (1896) (11 days); Satterwhite v.
Harriman National Bank & Trust Co.f 13 F. Supp. 493 (D. N.Y. 1935)
(10 days); Keller v. Halsev, 130 A.D. 598, 115 N.Y.S. 564 (1909) (9
15
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

days); In Re Dickinson, 171 A.D. 486, 157 N.Y.S. 248 (1916) (8
days); James Wood General Trading Establishment v. Coe, 191 F.Supp.
330 (D. N.Y. 1961), rev'd. on other grounds, 297 F.2d 651 (2d Cir.
1961) (1 week) ; Phillips v. Bank of Athens Trust Co., 202 Misc.
698, 119 N.Y.S.2d 47 (1952) (1 week); Hartford Accident & Indemnity
Co. v. Walston & Co.. 291 N.Y.S.2d 366, 238 N.E.2d 754 (1968) (6
days); Durant v. Block. 113 N.J. 509, 174 A. 889 (1934) (2 days).
2.

A Thirty-Day Period Meets the Test for Determining What
Constitutes a "Reasonable Time" to Calculate Damages
Under the New York Rule.

The Supreme Court of Minnesota has recently developed a test
for determining what constitutes a "reasonable time" in cases such
as the instant case.

The Minnesota court's standard lends even

more support to the premise that the trial court erred in granting
plaintiff's

motion

for

partial

summary

judgment

and

denying

defendant's motion for partial summary judgment. In Hornblower and
Weeks-Hemphill Noyes v. Lazere, 301 Minn. 462, 222 N.W.2d 799, 807
(1974), the Minnesota court stated:
[W]e conclude that the most important question
to be considered by the trier of fact in
determining the reasonable period of time is
what amount of time is necessary to allow the
owner of the stock a reasonable opportunity to
consult counsel, to employ other brokers, and
to watch the market in order to determine
whether and at what price to repurchase other
stocks in place of those converted.
Id. at 807.
It is undisputed that plaintiff learned on or about May 4,
1988 that Atlas and Check Rite would not transfer her stock in
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accordance with her request. Within two weeks of learning of the
conversion, plaintiff contacted Atlas and Old Republic about her
situation. Plaintiff's own affidavits state that at that time she
was in contact with various brokers making markets in Check Rite
stock and was familiar with market conditions. (R. 389-92, 413-16)
It also appears from her affidavits that plaintiff had some degree
of expertise in securities. When applying the Hornblower test to
the facts of this case, it is clear that thirty days was ample time
for the plaintiff to consult counsel, to employ other brokers and
to watch the market in order to determine whether and at what price
to purchase other stocks to replace those which had been converted.
Therefore, under the Hornblower test, thirty days would constitute
a "reasonable time" to fix damages in this case.
C.

The Facts That Plaintiff Used to Support Her Argument for a
Ninety-Day Period Were Disputed and Immaterial.
Furthermore, in urging the trial court to grant her motion for

partial summary judgment, plaintiff used numerous factual matters
to support her ninety-day damage period
disputed, but also irrelevant and

that were not only

immaterial to the alleged

tortious conversion of plaintiff's stock by Atlas and Check Rite.
Plaintiff offered only self-serving statements that as of May 4,
1988, she did not understand that the actions of defendants Atlas
and Check Rite constituted conversion.

Plaintiff also pointed to

the alleged conduct of Old Republic as excusing her knowledge of
the conversion. She argues that through June, July, and August of
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1988, Old Republic purposely lulled her into believing that they
would remedy her predicament.
Old Republics actions with regard to the plaintiff in June,
July, and August of 1988 are irrelevant and immaterial to the
determination of when to fix the damages for the conversion of
plaintiff's stock by Atlas and Check Rite for several reasons.
First, Old Republic did not convert plaintiff's stock. Second, Old
Republic had no reason to purposefully lull the plaintiff into
believing that they would remedy her predicament while the price of
her stock increased.

Finally, there was no basis in fact or law

for plaintiff to expect Old Republic to directly remedy the
conversion of Atlas and Check Rite. Therefore, the alleged actions
or omissions were irrelevant and immaterial to the determination of
the appropriate time for calculating damages flowing from the
conversion of plaintiff's stock.
Even if the alleged actions or omissions of Old Republic were
relevant to the determination of when to fix plaintiff's damages,
those factual matters were in dispute, and should have precluded
summary judgment. If one compares plaintiff's affidavits with the
affidavit of Paul S. Guardalabene, Assistant Claims Attorney for
Old Republic, one finds the facts surrounding Old Republic's
conduct

are

in

conflict.

For

example,

in

his

affidavit,

Guardalabene states that he never indicated or inferred that
plaintiff had a right to recover her damages directly from Old
Republic.

(R. 518-24)

Plaintiff's affidavits state, without any
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factual

foundation,

that

Guardalabene

had

essentially

told

plaintiff that Old Republic could settle directly with her, and
that plaintiff should rely on Old Republic to resolve the dispute.
(R. 389-92, 413-16)

Such "factual" assertions were clearly in

dispute at the time of Judge Uno's ruling.
Based on the foregoing authority that thirty days rather than
ninety days are a "reasonable time" under the New York rule, and
that plaintiff's "lulling" facts are either irrelevant or in
dispute, this Court should rule that the trial court erred in
granting plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment.

Also,

based on this overwhelming weight of authority, this Court should
award defendants' motion for partial summary judgment on Counts I
and II of plaintiff's complaint and fix her damages at a date no
later than June 3, 1988, 30 days after she learned of the
conversion of her stock.
D.

The Affidavits Upon Which Plaintiff Relied Did Not Comport
With the Requirements of Rule 56(e) U.R.C.P., and Should Have
Been Stricken.
In conjunction with the parties' cross motions for partial

summary judgment, defendants moved to strike the affidavits of
plaintiff, Chuck Burton, Potter Investment, and Penny Grace.

(R.

42 6-27) Defendants sought to strike the subject affidavits because
the affidavits did not comply with Rule 56(e), U.R.C.P.

Rule

56(e), U.R.P.C., governs the use of affidavits in conjunction with
motions for summary judgment. Rule 56(e) states in pertinent part
as follows:
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Form of Affidavits; Further Testimony; Defense
Required. Supporting and opposing affidavits
shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set
forth such pertinent facts as would be
admissible in evidence and shall show
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to
testify to the matters stated therein . . . .
At

the

deficiencies

time
in the

of

hearing,

defendants

pointed

out

affidavits upon which plaintiff

the

relied.

Plaintiff's affidavits contained opinion, legal conclusions and
facts not supported by adequate foundation.
428-31)

(R. 389-92, 413-16,

The Chuck Burton affidavit contained hearsay, and lacked

adequate foundation for many of the facts stated therein.
80, 428-31)

(R. 379-

The affidavit from Potter Investment Co. likewise

contained hearsay, lacked adequate foundation for many of the facts
found therein, and impermissible legal conclusions.
428-31)

(R. 381-83,

Finally, the affidavit of Penny Grace lacked foundation

for the facts stated therein.

(R. 387-88)

The Utah Supreme Court in Walker v. Rocky Mountain Recreation
Corp., 508 P.2d 538 (Utah 1973), affirmed a trial court's refusal
to consider an affidavit containing unsubstantiated opinions and
conclusions. In Walker, the action was brought to recover judgment
for an amount stipulated to in a settlement agreement.
moved for summary judgment.

Plaintiff

Defendant opposed the motion with an

affidavit from defendant's president containing unsubstantiated
opinions and conclusions. Summary judgment was entered in favor of
plaintiff

and

defendant

appealed.

In affirming
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the

summary

judgment, the court stated that:
Statements made merely on information and
belief will be disregarded.
Hearsay and
opinion testimony that would not be admissible
if testified to at trial may not properly be
set forth in an affidavit.
Id. at 542.
See also Treloqgan v. Trelocrcran, 699 P.2d 747 (Utah

1985).

Likewise, in the instant case, the affidavits of plaintiff,
Chuck Burton, Potter Investment and Penny Grace did not comport
with the requirements of Rule 56(e) U.R.C.P., and should have been
disregarded in considering the merits of the parties' respective
cross motions for.partial summary judgment. In refusing to strike
the affidavits, the trial court committed error.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING PLAINTIFF
HER ATTORNEY'S FEES FOR PREVAILING ON COUNTS I
AND II OF HER AMENDED COMPLAINT.
On September 6, 1990, the trial court entered

judgment

awarding plaintiff's attorney's fees in the amount of one-third of
the principal judgment under Counts I and II of her amended
complaint.

Assuming that the trial court was correct in awarding

partial summary judgment to plaintiff on Counts I and II of her
amended complaint, the trial court nevertheless erred in awarding
attorney's fees to plaintiff.
Utah has consistently followed the well-established rule that
attorney's fees should be awarded to the prevailing party only if
they are provided for by contract or statute.

Watkiss & Campbell
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v, Foa & Son, 808 P. 2d 1061 (Utah 1991) (citing Canyon Country
Store

v,

Bracey.

781

P.2d

414, 419-20

(Utah

1989));

Turtle

Management. Inc. v. Haggis Management, 645 P.2d 667, 671 (Utah
1982) •

In the case at hand, it is undisputed that there is no

contractual basis for an award of attorney's fees.

Therefore,

plaintiff could recover attorney's fees only if such an award is
provided for by statute.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (Supp. 1991) provides as statutory
basis for a trial court to award attorney's fees to a prevailing
party

whether

there

is

evidence

of

"bad

faith"

litigation.

Plaintiff's prayer for relief under Counts I and II, also asserted
an entitlement to an award of attorney's fees under Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-27-56.

Section 78-27-56 provides:

(1)

In civil actions, the court shall award
reasonable
attorney's
fees
to
a
prevailing party if the court determines
that the action or defense of the action
was without merit and not brought or
asserted in good faith, except under
Subsection (2).

(2)

The court, in its discretion, may award
no fees or limited fees against a party
under Subsection (1) , but only if the
court:
(a)

finds the party has
filed
an
affidavit of impecuniosity in the
action before the court; or

(b)

the court enters in the record the
reason for not awarding fees under
the provisions of Subsection (1).

Id.
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In 1991, the Utah Supreme Court in Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa
& Sons, 808 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1991), examined the requirements of an
award under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56. Watkiss involved an action
by a law firm to recover fees from a former client.

The trial

court in the case awarded summary judgment in favor of the law
firm.

The trial court also awarded attorney's fees to the law

firm, however it did not make specific findings as to how or why it
awarded these attorney's fees.
On appeal, the law firm argued that a trial court is not
required to enter specific findings as to why it awarded attorney's
fees, but rather that such specific findings are required only when
the trials court does not award attorney's fees. The Utah Supreme
Court rejected such an argument by stating:
[W]hen a party seeks recovery of attorney's
fees under § 78-27-56, the trial court must
make specific findings with regard to each
element of the statute.
Specific findings
further the ends of justice by allowing
appeals court to better review the trial
court's award. Without specific findings, a
reviewing court cannot determine whether the
award of attorney fees was based upon a
meritless claim brought in bad faith or simply
because the recovering party prevailed.
Id. at 1068.
Under Watkiss, a trial court must make specific findings as to
why it awarded attorney's fees. No such findings were made in this
case.

(R. 818-19)

The trial court's order gives no indication,

let alone specific findings, as to why the trial court awarded
attorney's fees. The order does not state that defendants' claims
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were without merit and brought in bad faith.

The order likewise

does not even state that attorney's fees were awarded pursuant to
§ 78-27-56.

The award of attorney's fees in this case does not

give any guidance nor to this court as to why the trial court made
such an award.
Based on the lack of specific findings in the trial court's
order awarding attorney's fees and the Supreme Court of Utah's
ruling in Watkiss requiring such specific findings, this court
should find that the trial court erred in awarding attorney's fees
to plaintiff.

The issue of attorney's fees should be either be

reversed as a matter of law or be vacated and remanded to the trial
court for a determination of

whether, pursuant to Utah Code Ann.

§ 78-27-56, attorney's fees should be awarded.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, defendants respectfully request that
this court reverse the order granting partial summary judgment in
favor of plaintiff on Counts I and II and order that the trial
court grant defendants' cross motion for partial summary judgment
on Counts I and II. The defendants also respectfully request this
court to reverse or in the alternative vacate and remand for
further proceedings the trial court's order granting attorney's
fees to plaintiff.
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ADDENDUM
Amended complaint and Jury Demand
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Affidavit of Ernest Muth

R.324

Affidavit of Chuck Barton

R. 379

Affidavit of Potter Investment Company

R.381

Supporting Affidavit of Penny G. Grace

R. 387

Affidavit of Plaintiff in Support of Her
Motion for Summary Judgment on Counts I and
II of Her Amended Complaint
Affidavit of Plaintiff in Opposition to

R.389

Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment . . .

R. 413

Affidavit of Paul S. Guardalabene

R. 518

Judgment and Order

R. 710

Judgment for Attorney's Fees

R. 818

Order Granting Amended Rule 54(b) Motion to
Certify Judgments as Final

R. 842
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JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS. No. 3639
ATTORNEY for Plaintiff 72 East 400 South, Suite 220
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone No.: (801) 359-0833

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

LeANNA BROADWATER,
Plaintiff.
v.

AMENDED COMPLAINT AND
JURY DEMAND

OLD REPUBLIC SURETY, a Wisconsin
corporation doing business in
Utah. NORTH WESTERN NATIONAL
INSURANCE COMPANY OF MILWAUKEE,
WISCONSIN, a Wisconsin
corporation, doing business in
Utah, ATLAS STOCK TRANSFER, a
Utah Corporation, CHECK RITE
INTERNATIONAL INC., f/k/a CARDINAL
ENERGY CORPORATION, a Utah
corporation, and SCOTT J.
FLETCHER, a Utah resident.

Civil No. 89-0902684-CV
Judge Raymond S. Uno

Defendants.

Plaintiff LeAnna Broadwater hereby alleges and complains that Defendants jointly and
severally or individually where otherwise indicated as follows:
PARTIES
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1. Plaintiff LeAnna Broadwater is a Salt Lake County resident. She is the lawful and
undisputed assignee or successor-in-interest of KASU Securities, Inc., the purchaser of
certain shares of Cardinal Energy Corporation subject to this dispute.

2. Defendant Atlas Stock Transfer Corporation, ("Atlas") is a Utah corporation doing
business in Salt Lake County. It is an obligee on the open penalty indemnity bond subject
hereto.
3. Defendant Cardinal Energy Corporation ("Cardinal") n/k/a Check-Rite International,
Inc., ("Check-Rite") is a publicly held Utah corporation and the issuer of the securities
subject to this dispute. Its transfer agent is Atlas and it is an obligee on the open penalty
indemnity bond subject hereto.
4. Defendant Northwestern National Insurance Company of Milwaukee, Wisconsin
("Northwestern") is a Wisconsin corporation licensed as a foreign corporation to do
business in Utah and further licensed with the Utah Insurance Department to do business in
this state. It is the obligor on the open penalty indemnity bond subject hereto.

5. Defendant Old Republic Surety ("Old Republic") is a Wisconsin corporation licensed
as a foreign corporation to do business in the state of Utah and further licensed with the
Utah Insurance Department to do business in this state. It is believed to have acquired
Defendant Northwestern and therefore it is the assignee or sucoessor-in-interest of all
claims as against Defendant Northwestern.
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6. Defendant Scott J. Fletcher is a Utah resident. He is the purchaser of and principal
on the open penalty indemnity bond at issue in this case which he obtained through fraud as
set forth below.
JURISDICTION
7. Jurisdiction over the parties is based on the fact that state courts are of general
jurisdiction and Defendants Northwestern and Old Republic have consented to jurisdiction
by being licensed in this state to do business. Jurisdiction is further based on 18 U.S.C.
§1964(c) of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
8. On August 17,1981, Defendant Fletcher placed an order to sell six thousand
(6,000) shares of Cardinal Energy Corporation ("Cardinal") with Potter Investment Company
("Potter"), a local securities broker-dealer as evidenced by Exhibit "A" hereto, a true and
correct copy of Fletcher's stock sale confirmation. On the same date, Fletcher placed a
similar order with Potter to sell 2,000 Cardinal shares represented by Certificate 568 for the
account of Jeanne Winder, Fletcher's neighbor, as further set forth below.
9. On August 27,1981, Defendant Fletcher placed a another order with Potter to sell
two thousand (2,000) additional shares of Cardinal as evidenced by Exhibit "B" hereto, a true
and correct copy of Fletcher's stock sale confirmation.
10. To honor Fletcher's 8,000 share sale orders, Fletcher delivered Cardinal
certificate No. 258, representing eight thousand (8,000) shares, ^and issued in his name to
Potter on 7/27/81.
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11. On 7/27/81, Potter issued a check to Fletcher in the amount of $1,699.80 as
payment for his sale of six thousand (6,000) Cardinal shares. It is undisputed that such
check was received by Fletcher and deposited in his bank account as evidenced by Exhibit
"C" hereto, a true and correct copy of such Potter check, front and reverse sides thereof.

12. On 8 / 4 / 8 1 , Potter issued a check to Fletcher in the amount of five hundred sixty
dollars ($560.00) as payment for his 4/27/81 sale of two thousand (2,000) Cardinal shares.
It is undisputed that such check was received by Fletcher and deposited in his bank account
as evidenced by Exhibit "D", a true and correct copy of such Potter check, front and reverse
sides thereof.
13. On or about September 21, 1981, Plaintiff Broadwater, acting on behalf of KASU
Securities, purchased eight thousand (8,000) shares of Cardinal stock from Potter. Potter
delivered certificate No. 258 to Plaintiff which had been signed over by Fletcher and
properly signatured guaranteed. Such is known in the securities industry as "street stock"
and certificates representing such are negotiable instruments.
14. Approximately one (1) year later, on or about August 23, 1982, Fletcher falsely
claimed that certificate No. 258 had been lost or stolen. Thereupon Fletcher posted a
bond through Defendant Northwestern (now Old Republic) and paid the premium thereon.
Fletcher was issued a new Cardinal certificate in the amount of eight thousand (8,000)
shares. A true and correct copy on such bond which is the subject of this dispute, the
premium of which was accepted by Defendant Northwestern, is attached hereto and
incorporated by reference as Exhibit "E", denominated by bond No. UMI871385.

-

4

-
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15. Such open penalty indemnity bond, Exhibit "E" hereto, sets forth Defendant
Northwestern as the obligor thereon and Defendants Atlas and Cardinal (now Check-Rite)
as obligees.
16. On or about August 9. 1982, Defendant Fletcher also sold, through Potter,
Cardinal certificate No. 676, also representing eight thousand (8,000) shares and also
registered in his name. A true and correct copy of Fletcher's stock sale confirmation is
attached hereto and incorporated by reference as Plaintiff's Exhibit " F .
17. Defendant Fletcher received $1,374.20 from Potter on 8/25/82 for his sale of
certificate 676 as evidenced by Exhibit "G" hereto, a true and correct copy of Potter's
returned check, front and reverse sides thereof, further evidencing deposit of such in
Fletcher's bank account.
18. It is undisputed that after selling certificate No. 676 and receiving valuable
consideration therefor, Fletcher on or about November 23. 1983. claimed and alleged that
Cardinal certificate No. 676 had been lost or stolen.
19. On November 23, 1983. Fletcher, after having previously sold certificate No. 676,
and having declared it lost or stolen, caused Defendant Northwestern to issue an additional
open penalty indemnity bond to cancel certificate 676. A true and correct copy of this
additional bond, obtained from Defendant Northwestern for Fletcher's benefit, is attached
hereto and incorporated by reference as Exhibit "H" and denominated by Bond No.
UMI902168.
20. A new replacement certificate was then issued to Fletcher on said date by Atlas in
reliance on such bond.
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21. Subsequently, certificate 676 surfaced and when it was submitted for transfer,
Defendant Northwestern, after demand by Defendant Atlas, paid sufficient funds to replace
that certificate in the amount of eight thousand (8,000) shares for its bona fide purchaser.
22. It is thus undisputed that Fletcher was issued an additional eight thousand (8,000)
shares on at least two occasions or at total of 16,000 shares as a result of his posting two
open penalty indemnity bonds through Defendant Northwestern.
23. Based on the foregoing, Fletcher was able to unlawfully obtain an additional
sixteen thousand (16,000) shares to which he was not entitled and which he is also believed
to have subsequently sold, as with the first sixteen thousand shares (16,000), in interstate
commerce.
24. The foregoing actions of Fletcher were a fraud in that Fletcher had not lost or
had stolen either certificate 258 or 676 inasmuch as he had sold such certificates and knew
or had to have known he had done such.
25. The two frauds of Fletcher each constitute a "predicate act" of racketeering as
contemplated in 18 U.S.C. §1961(1) of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act and a "pattern" in that regard as contemplated thereunder.
26. Plaintiff further asserts and believes that Fletcher was and has been under
criminal investigation by the Utah Attorney Genernl's office for such frauds, an investigation
at one time spear-headed by David Baskam, a former Assistant Attorney General. Plaintiff
further believes that Fletcher has been brought before an LDS Bishop's Court for his history
and pattern of fraudulent activity. In this regard, Plaintiff asserts and believes that
Fletcher, relative to a "project" in Green River, Utah. Fletcher was promoting, also
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defrauded Jeanne C. Winder and her family out of approximately $14,000. This conduct
may constitute but another "predicate act(s) of racketeering" on the part of Fletcher as
contemplated in RICO.
27. Plaintiff further asserts and believes that Defendant Fletcher is a sophisticated
businessman who is knowledgeable about securities and brokerage affairs and who
maintains numerous brokerage accounts. For this reason his actions are nothing less than
intentional, let alone reckless, as contemplated in Section 61-1-22(1 )(b) of the Utah Uniform
Securities Act and otherwise under federal securities and other laws.
28. Plaintiff believes and asserts that Fletcher has engaged in similar if not identical
"predicate acts of racketeering", namely by fraudulently obtaining lost instrument bonds on
securities already sold or which he intends to sell and does sell in interstate commerce or
through the mails.
29. Plaintiff further asserts that Fletcher was acting or has acted as an investment or
business advisor for others, including one Jeanne C. Winder, believed to be an
unsophisticated woman. Fletcher also has never registered under the Investment Advisor's
Act or Utah's statutory counterpart thereto.
30. On the same day as Fletcher sold 6,000 Cardinal shares, namely 7/17/81, Fletcher
also sold two thousand (2,000) shares of Cardinal through Potter for Winder's account and
he, not Winder, received $560 from Potter on 7/27/81. Fletcher delivered certificate No.
568 to Potter. On or about December 14, 1982, Fletcher, for Ms* Winder, posted an
identical Northwestern open penalty indemnity bond on certificate No. 568, based on the
belief that the certificate Fletcher sold, for Winder on 7/17/81, had been (like Fletcher's
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two other certs) lost or stolen. A true and correct copy of a third bond Fletcher posted
through Northwestern for Winder on alleged lost or stolen certificate 568 is attached
hereto as Exhibit "I" and denominated by Bond No. UMI880735.
31. Ms. Winder was a neighbor of Fletcher and Plaintiff asserts that at all times
Winder was acting at Fletcher's exclusive direction. Further, Fletcher was a "control
person" of Winder as contemplated in Section 15 of the Securities Act of 1933 and Section
20(a) of the Securities Act of 1934 and therefore her acts are ascribable or attributable to
Fletcher and he is thereby liable therefor.
32. Based on Fletcher's control of Winder, Plaintiff asserts and believes that the
activity of Winder through Fletcher is but a third "predicate act of racketeering" ascribable
and attributable to Fletcher. Plaintiff asserts that Winder would not have sold her two
thousand shares (2,000) and then posted an identical lost instrument bond with the very
same bonding company used twice by Fletcher unless she was acting under his exclusive
control, direction, and advice.
33. On or during February, 1985, based on Winder's alleged lost certificate, Potter,
who had purchased certificate 568 from Fletcher for Winder's account put a demand on
Defendants Check-Rite, Atlas, and Northwestern to replace certificate No. 568 allegedly
lost by Winder.
34. Potter obtained a quote on two thousand (2,000) shares of Check-Rite during
February, 1985, and Defendant Northwestern honored its obligation on the Winder bond,
purchasing such two thousand (2,000) shares in the open market to cover its liability.
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Thereby, Potter received two thousand (2,000) replacement shares of Check-Rite which it
delivered to the bona fide purchaser of certificate 568.
35. Based on the foregoing, Defendant Northwestern honored the Winder bond and
the second bond posted by Fletcher on certificate 676 but, under absolutely identical
circumstances, has refused to honor bond No. UMI871385 in bad faith and to the detriment
of Plaintiff as set forth more fully hereinbelow. (See f21 hereinabove.)

36. In May, 1988, Plaintiff submitted Cardinal certificate 258 to Atlas Stock Transfer
to be registered in her name. Until that time Plaintiff had held such certificate in her safe
deposit box for purposes of investment until such time as she sought to have such shares
transferred.
37. Atlas responded with a letter attached hereto and incorporated by reference as
Exhibit "J" in which it refused to act on Plaintiff's lawful request.
38. Thereafter, Atlas directed Plaintiff to resolve the dispute directly with Defendant
Northwestern and/or Potter.
39. Plaintiff telephoned Northwestern's local office in May 1988 and lodged her
complaint which was ignored.
40. Based on the non-responsiveness of Northwestern and/or Old Republic's local
office, Plaintiff, in May 1988, subsequently telephoned such Insurance Company Defendant's
main offices in Milwaukee, and, over the ensuing months had numerous telephone
conversations with one Paul S. Guardalabene ("Guardalabene"), Assistant Claims Attorney
for Defendants Northwestern and Old Republic.
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41. Guardalabene proceeded to delay the matter by requesting voluminous and totally
unnecessary and irrelevant documentation as to how, why, and when Plaintiff obtained the
eight thousand (8,000) shares from KASU Securities, Inc., etc. During such telephone
conversations of which there were several, Plaintiff continually put demand on
Guardalabene to replace her 8,000 shares consistent with the Insurance Company
Defendants' obligations under the open penalty bond. During this time, Guardalabene
treated Plaintiff and gave Plaintiff the reasonable impression that she was the obligee on
the open penalty indemnity bond and that it was appropriate for her, as opposed to Atlas
and Check-Rite, to deal directly with the Insurance Company Defendants.

42. Prior to July 1988, Guardalabene also had telephone discussions with Potter and
was informed by and otherwise put on notice directly by John Potter that penny stocks such
as Check-Rite were volatile and that therefore he (Guardalabene) ought to hurry and
replace Plaintiff's eight thousand (8,000) share certificate.
43. Regardless of such demands and warnings, Guardalabene continued to stall and
delay Plaintiff and based on Guardalabene's dishonor of the bond posted by Fletcher,
Plaintiff sent a letter to Guardalabene dated July 11, 1988, a true and correct copy of which
is attached hereto as Plaintiff's Exhibit "K". Such letter evidences but further uninterrupted
demand made by Plaintiff on the Insurance Company/Obligor Defendants to replace
Plaintiff's eight thousand (8,000) shares.
44. Plaintiff's continued demands were refused by Defendants Atlas, Check-Rite, and
more particularly, the Insurance Company/Obligor Defendants.
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45. On July 27, 1988. after continued irrational stalling and delay tactics on the part
of Guardalabene. acting on behalf of the Insurance Company/Obligor Defendants. Plaintiff
wrote another letter to Guardalabene. a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto
as Exhibit "L", and which put Guardalabene on further unequivocal notice that Plaintiff not
only demanded a replacement certificate but that Check-Rite stock had reached a price of
one dollar per share and could continue to rise in price.
46. After receipt of Exhibits "K" and Exhibit "L" above, the Insurance Company/Obligor
Defendants proceeded to do nothing and otherwise redress the damages caused Plaintiff.

47. Plaintiff asserts that on or about July 28, 1988, the price of Check-Rite Stock
traded at $1.25 per share in Salt Lake City. This is evidenced by a letter from Bagley
Securities, Inc., a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto and incorporated by
referance as Exhibit "M".
48. At this time Plaintiff was also in contact with one Chuck Burton, an account
executive with Kober Financial in Denver, Colorado, a market maker in Check-Rite stock.

49. Kober Financial informed and has informed Plaintiff that the price of Check-Rite
stock traded as high as a $1.50 in Denver, Colorado on or after July 28, 1988. Chuck
Burton has also telephoned Guardalabene and informed him personally of this fact.
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50. The Defendants, knew or should have known that the price of Check-Rite stock
would trade or could have traded as high as a $1.50 per share after May 1988, which it did.

51. Had the Insurance Company/Obligor Defendants and issuer/transfer
agent /obligee Defendants replaced Plaintiff's eight thosuand (8,000) shares when request
for transfer and registration was made, she could have and would have sold them at a $1.50
per share in Denver or at least $1.25 in Salt Lake City, Utah, in July, 1988, and/or at the
beginning of August, 1988.
52. Plaintiff believes and asserts that Defendant Northwestern has a history and
pattern of refusing to honor its open penalty indemnity bonds, particularly if they are in
excess of a small amount of money, as further evidenced by a lawsuit involving Defendant
Old Republic and filed in the Third Judicial District Court of Utah denominated by Civil No.
C88-3713, assigned to the Honorable Raymond Uno. At such time that Plaintiff discovers
additional "predicate acts" of racketeering on the part of the Insurance Company/Obligor
Defendants, she shall seek to amend this complaint and state a cause of action against
them under 18 U.S.C. §1962(a),(b),(c), and/or (d).
53. Defendants Atlas and Check-Rite have put substantial and repeated demands on
Northwestern and Old Republic to honor its bond, the principal of which is Scott Fletcher.
Such demands on the part of Atlas have been refused and ignored since May, 1988.

54. Plaintiff's counsel has further put continued and repeated demands on the
Insurance Company/Obligor Defendants and on the issuer/transfer agent/obligee
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Defendants to issue Plaintiff a replacement certificate or otherwise pay her damages of the
highest price of the stock since the time Plaintiff could have sold her replacement shares
but for Defendants' wrongful conduct. Evidence of such written formal demands include
three (3) letters from Plaintiff's counsel directed to such Defendants dated September 21,
1988, September 30, 1988, and November 25,1988.
55. Such Defendants with the exception of Defendant Fletcher have refused to make
proper restitution to Plaintiff.
56. Plaintiff's counsel has spent at least 25 hours negotiating in good faith with
Defendants to make restitution to Plaintiff, such negotiations being undertaken by
Defendants in bad faith and therefore Plaintiff is entitled to attorney's fees of at least
$2,500.00, exclusive of attorney's fees paid her counsel to initiate this action.

57. The Defendants' refusals, with the exception of the Fletcher, have further been
asserted in bad faith for which Plaintiff is entitled to an award of attorney's fees pursuant
to Section 78-27-56, Utah Code Ann.
58. None of the Defendants have defended the demands of Plaintiff by asserting that
the lost instrument bond in issue was not valid or binding or that the Defendants
Northwestern and Old Republic did not receive or accept the premium in consideration for
its issuance.
CAUSES OF ACTION
COUNT I
WRONGFUL REFUSAL TO TRANSFER
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59. Plaintiff incorporates each and every allegation elsewhere herein as if each were
set forth more fully hereafter verbatim.
60. Plaintiff was a bona fide purchaser of eight thousand (8,000) shares of Cardinal
(Check-Rite) as fully comtemplated in I70A-8-401 and 405(3) Utah Uniform Commercial
Code, Investment Securities.
61. Plaintiff had no knowledge of Defendant Fletcher's fraud nor did she know or had
she ever heard of Fletcher at the time of her acquisition of such shares or otherwise until
May, 1988.
62. Plaintiff, as a purchaser, had no notice of any adverse claims as contemplated in
§70A-8-304, Utah Uniform Commercial Code ("U.U.C.C.").
63. In May, 1988, Plaintiff presented certificate 258 to Defendant Atlas Stock Transfer
and lawfully requested transfer in accordance with I70A-8-306, U.U.C.C.
64. Certificate 258 was properly endorsed as fully contemplated in Article 8, U.U.C.C.

65. Plaintiff had no duty of inquiry into the problems posed by Defendant Fletcher's
wrongful and fraudulent conduct.
66. Plaintiff had no obligation to register her transfer until such time until she sought
to do so.
67. Plaintiff's right to registration was not affected by Fletcher's indorsement as such
did not give notice of any adverse claims. (See Section 70A-8-3J0, U.U.C.C.)
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68. Assuming Fletcher's indorsement on certificate 258 was unauthorized, which it
was not, such was ratified by Fletcher's sale of certificate 258 through Potter in July 1981
and his receipt of valuable consideration for such sale. (See Section 70A-8-311. U.U.C.C.)

69. Plaintiff was a purchaser of certificate 258 for value and without notice of any
adverse claims.
70. At the time of Plaintiff's purchase or assignment, she could not have known of any
adverse claims as Fletcher waited one (1) year after he sold it before fraudulently claiming
certificate 258 was lost or stolen.
71. A bona fide purchaser is entitled to transfer and registration without
unreasonable delay as provided in §70A-8-401 and 405(3) U.U.C.C.

72. Defendant Atlas and Check-Rite should have transferred and registered Plaintiff's
eight thousand (8,000) shares in May, 1988 when so presented.
73. Such Defendants' abject failure to do so has damaged Plaintiff in that she was
unable to sell such eight thousand (8,000) shares in July or August. 1988. when Check-Rite
stock reached a price of a $1.50 per share.
74. Had Plaintiff obtained replacement shares in May 1988, she would have
subsequently sold such shares and obtained approximately $12,000.

75. Plaintiff prays for damages against Defendants Atlas and Check-Rite as set forth
below.
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COUNT II
CONVERSION
76. Plaintiff incorporates each and every allegation elsewhere herein as if each were
set forth more fully hereafter verbatim.
77. Defendants Atlas and Check-Rite received delivery and possession of certificate
258, Plaintiff's certificate representing the eight thousand (8,000) shares, in May, 1988.
78. Such Defendants have interfered with Plaintiff's right to control and possess eight
thousand (8,000) shares of Check-Rite since May, 1988.
79. Such wrongful interference has been intentional and has caused Plaintiff great
expense, inconvenience, and damage.
80. Such Defendants have effectively converted eight thousand (8,000) shares of
Check-Rite belonging to Plaintiff to their own use.
81. Such possession of certificate 258 by such Defendants since May, 1988 is
inconsistent with Plaintiff's right of control and ownership thereof.
82. Such Defendants have virtually done nothing to remedy the dispute which, prior to
filing this complaint, has caused Plaintiff to incur attorney's fees of approximately $2,500.
83. A mistake of law or fact is not a defense to such Defendants' conversion.

84. Plaintiff prays for damages against Defendants Atlas and Check-Rite as set forth
below.
COUNT III
BREACH OF AN IMPLIED COVENANT
OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING
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85. Plaintiff incorporates each and every allegation elsewhere herein as if each were
set forth more fully hereafter verbatim.
86. The relationship between Plaintiff and the Defendants, with the exception of
Defendant Fletcher (with whom Plaintiff was not privity), required such Defendants to deal
fairly with Plaintiff and otherwise act in good faith.
87. Such an obligation was a covenant that such Defendants each and all have
breached.
88. Utah law recognizes such a cause of action and further that punitive damages are
available hereunder.
89. Defendants, with the exception of Defendant Fletcher, are liable to Plaintiff for
their breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing which has damaged
Plaintiff damage as set forth below.
COUNT IV
BREACH OF AN IMPLIED THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY
CONTRACT ON THE PART OF THE INSURANCE COMPANY DEFENDANTS
90. Plaintiff incorporates each and every allegation elsewhere herein as if each were
set forth more fully hereafter verbatim.
91. Defendant Insurance Companies entered into an agreement whereby they agreed
to indemnify Defendants Atlas and Check-Rite from any loss caused by the resurfacing of
Check-Rite certificate 258.
92. The Insurance Company Defendants have breached such agreement by failing to
honor the bond issued by them.
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93. Such breach of contract on the part of the Insurance Company Defendants has
caused Plaintiff, a bona fide purchaser of certificate 258. substantial damage and injury in
that Plaintiff has not been able to seek restitution from Atlas and Check-Rite until such
bond was honored by the Insurance Company Defendants.
94. The Insurance Company Defendants have no excuse or defense for their failure to
honor the bond issued by them and they have maliciously lulled Plaintiff into the belief that
she was an obligee on the bond.
95. Based on the Insurance Company Defendants' breach of contract which they knew
and had reason to know would damage Plaintiff or a person similarly situated, such
Defendants are liable to Plaintiff for all damages as a result of such breach as set forth
below.
COUNT V
BAD FAITH REFUSAL ON THE PART OF THE
INSURANCE COMPANY DEFENDANTS
96. Plaintiff incorporates each and every allegation elsewhere herein as if each were
set forth more fully hereafter verbatim.
97. The Insurance Company Defendants have no excuse for their failure to honor
bond No. UMI871385.
98. Such Defendants have had since early May, 1988. to honor the bond issued by
them.
99. Such Defendants acted negligently or otherwise intentionally in refusing to honor
their bond obligation and otherwise remedy Plaintiff's damages immediately and reasonably.
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100. Such Defendants have not acted reasonably and have acted in bad faith by
innundating Plaintiff with false excuses for their failure to honor such bond and their legal
commitment with respect thereto. Such excuses include but are not limited to (1)
unreasonably demanding numerous documentation from Plaintiff that she was the lawful
successor-in-interest of KASU Securities, Inc., (when Atlas had no dispute with such), (2)
informing Plaintiff that they were in fact investigating the matter when they were not, (3)
stalling several months and thereafter contending that the indorsement on certificate 258
was a forgery, and (4) ultimately informing Plaintiff that she had to deal with Atlas while all
along leading her to believe that she should deal directly with the Insurance Company
Defendants.
101. Plaintiff believes and asserts that the Insurance Company Defendants have
refused to honor other bonds of a similar nature over the last ten (10) years, bonds in
particular in which such Defendants' liability exceeds at least five hundred dollars ($500.00).

102. On the other hand, the Insurance Company Defendants have singled Plaintiff out
and not honored the bond covering her certificate while honoring the two other Fletcher
bonds detailed hereinabove.
103. Such bad faith refusal on the part of the Insurance Company Defendants is so
outrageous under the circumstances that Plaintiff is entitled to substantial punitive and
exemplary damages to deter such wrongful and malicious conduct in the future as set forth
below.
COUNT VI
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AIDING AND ABETTING
104. Plaintiff incorporates each and every allegation elsewhere herein as if each were
set forth more fully hereafter verbatim.
105. The Insurance Company Defendants knew or should have known that they were
putting Defendant Fletcher in a position where he could take advantage of and defraud
others as further set forth elsewhere herein.
106. The Insurance Company Defendants did not investigate Defendant Fletcher
reasonably, if at all. Had they done so. they would have either have not issued any bonds or,
they would have immediately paid for a replacement certificate in May, 1988.

107. The Insurance Company Defendants should have known better than to rely on
the false and fraudulent affidavits of Fletcher in issuing open penalty indemnity bonds for
his benefit.
108. The Insurance Company Defendants have issued at least three (3) bonds which
have benefited Fletcher, solely with regard to Check-Rite stock alone and may have issued
other bonds in his favor with regard to the securities of other issuers.
109. But for the substantial assistance and aiding and abetting on the part of the
Insurance Company Defendants, Fletcher would not have been able to fraudulently obtain
an additional sixteen thousand (16,000) shares of Check-Rite which he did in fact obtain
fraudulently and is believed to have thereafter sold in interstate pommerce. But for the
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Insurance Company Defendants' aiding and abetting and their subsequent bad faith refusals
which have further aided and abetted Fletcher, Plaintiff would not have been damaged.

110. But for the substantial assistance of the Insurance Company Defendants,
Fletcher would not of have been able to commit his frauds and racketeering as set forth
below.
111. The Insurance Company Defendants' aiding and abetting of Fletcher has
proximately caused Plaintiff damages as set forth below.
COUNT VII
NEGLIGENCE
112. Plaintiff incorporates each and every allegation elsewhere herein as if each were
set forth more fully hereafter verbatim.
113. Each and all of the Defendants owed Plaintiff the duty to prevent those damages
of which she has been caused.
114. Each Defendant breached that duty under their respective circumstances which
has been the proximate cause of Plaintiff's damages.
115. Reasonable persons in the same position of each of the Defendants would not
have acted in the manner that each Defendant has in fact acted.
116. Plaintiff is entitled to punitive and exemplary damages against each of the
Defendants for their individual and joint and several negligence \j/hich, under the
circumstances, has exceeded all bounds of reasonableness and for which such additional
damages are justified as set forth below.
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COUNT VIII
VIOLATION OF §12(2) OF THE SECURITIES ACT
OF 1933 BY DEFENDANT FLETCHER
117. Plaintiff incorporates each and every allegation elsewhere herein as if each were
set forth more fully hereafter verbatim.
118. Defendant Fletcher sold a security by the use or the means of an instrument of
interstate commerce or of the mails, by means of an oral communication, which included an
untrue statement of a material fact or which omitted to state a material fact necessary in
order to make his statements, in light of the circumstances under which they were made,
not misleading.
119. Defendant Fletcher, when he sold certificate 258 representing eight thousand
(8,000) shares, omitted to state that he would subsequently declare such certificate lost or
stolen, that he would execute a false affidavit under oath to that effect, obtain a bond,
receive an additional eight thousand (8,000) shares to which he was not entitled and
otherwise put Plaintiff or someone like her in her present position.
120. Plaintiff did not know and there is no way or means by which she could have
known of Fletcher's untruths or omissions when she obtained delivery of cerf iticate 258
from Potter.
121. Defendant Fletcher cannot sustain the burden that he did not know and in the
exercise of reasonable care could not have known of his untruths or omissions.
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122. Defendant Fletcher is the proximate cause, culpable participant, significant
factor, or proximate cause of the damages inflicted on Plaintiff and under §12(2) case law
Plaintiff need not be in direct privity with him to recover damages hereunder. Plaintiff thus
prays for damages against Fletcher as set forth below.
COUNT IX
VIOLATION OF SECTION 61-1-22(1 )(b) OF
THE UTAH UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT ON THE PART OF
DEFENDANT FLETCHER
123. Plaintiff incorporates each and every allegation elsewhere herein as if each were
set forth more fully hereafter verbatim.
124. This count is the Utah statutory conterpart to Section 12(2) of the Securities Act
of 1933, Plaintiff's preceding cause of action.
125. Plaintiff is entitled to an award of costs and attorney's fees hereunder.

126. Plaintiff is entitled to 12% interest from the date of payment for the stock
subject to this dispute.
127. Plaintiff did not discover Defendant Fletcher's violation hereunder until May,
1988.
128. Defendant Fletcher's violation of this statute is reckless or intentional for which
Plaintiff is entitled to damages of three times the consideration paid for the security with
interest thereon at the rate of 12% as set forth below.

COUNT X
COMMON LAW FRAUD ON THE PART OF DEFENDANT FLETCHER
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129. Plaintiff incorporates each and every allegation elsewhere herein as if each were
set forth more fully hereafter verbatim.
130. Defendant Fletcher engaged in a plan or scheme to defraud and injure Plaintiff or
someone like her which has caused her and those similarly situated substantial injury and
damage.
131. Defendant Fletcher, by selling certificate 258 through Potter Investment
Company, impliedly represented that he would not subsequently encumber such certificate,
knowing his representations as set forth hereinabove were false and that Plaintiff's problem
which has been created by him would eventually occur.
132. The representations made by Fletcher as per certificate No. 258 itself through
Potter and in turn to Plaintiff were false.
133. The false representations made by Defendant Fletcher concerned past or
present facts.
134. The past or present facts about which Defendant Fletcher made fale
misrepresentations were material.
135. The material, false representations made by Defendant Fletcher about past or
present facts were susceptible of knowledge by him.
136. Defendant Fletcher who so represented, knew that that which is alleged herein
was false or in the alternative, asserted such false representations as of his own knowledge
without knowing or discerning if such was true or false.
137. Defendant Fletcher intended that a customer of Potter be induced to act, or in
misleading a customer of Potter such as Plaintiff into thinking that she or someone like her
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was justified in purchasing the subject security and thereby relying on Fletcher's
misrepresentations and omissions.
138. A customer of Potter namely Plaintiff, was in fact induced to act or was justified
or reasonable under the circumstances in acting on Defendant Fletcher's false and
fraudulent representations and omissions either impliedly or directly as per certificate 258
on its face.
139. Plaintiff's purchase of the securities was in reliance on the representations of
Fletcher as he had endorsed certificate 258 and such was properly signatured guaranteed,
creating the undeniable impression that it was a negotiable instrument.

140. Plaintiff has suffered damages which are attributable to the misrepresentations
of Defendant Fletcher, based on his false and fraudulent representations or statements,
including his affidavit, which are the direct and proximate cause of Plaintiff's injury and
damage.
141. Defendant Fletcher's scheme or artifice to defraud a customer of Potter, which
has occurred on at least three occasions with the same security and with the same
Insurance Company Defendants, is malicious and harmful to the free enterprise system,
interstate commerce, and the securities industry as a whole, and entitles Plaintiff to
substantial punitive and exemplary damages to deter fraudulent schemes of this nature in
which is a sophisticated Defendant such as Fletcher takes advantage of and defrauds an
individual such as Plaintiff out of substantial funds.
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142. Defendant Fletcher has engaged in such a plan scheme or artifice to defraud
other individuals such as Plaintiff for the same purposes and under the same pretenses with
regard to the same security in issue and also with regard to the securities of other issuers.
In this regard, as set forth above, he is believed to have been the subject of a criminal
investigation.
143. Plaintiff had no avenue or reasonable means of knowing or discovering that
Fletcher's express and implied representations were false and fraudulent as Plaintiff was
not apprised of what Fletcher would subsequently do.
144. Fletcher's scheme or plan or artifice to defraud Plaintiff and someone like her
was designed to harm and injure her and those similarly situated.
145. The representations and/or omissions of Fletcher were false or fraudulent and
when made were then and there known by Fletcher to be false and fraudulent and his
misrepresentations were matters of material fact inducing Plaintiff's purchase of the
securities.
146. Said misrepresentations and omissions of Fletcher were made knowingly and
intentionally or with the reckless or holding negligent and wanton disregard for the truth for
the express purpose of obtaining additional stock for which Fletcher was not entitled and
thereby creating Plaintiff's present situation.
147. Defendant Fletcher had a duty not to make such representations to Plaintiff
through Potter and had a duty to disclose facts and circumstances which he abjectly failed
to disclose to Plaintiff through Potter.
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148. As a direct and proximate result of Fletcher's breaches of duty owed Plaintiff
and some one like her. Plaintiff has been substantially damaged and is entitled to have and
recover against Fletcher, in addition to actual damages, punitive and exemplary damages in
the amount of at least two hundred and fifty thousand dollars ($250,000.00).

COUNT XI
VIOLATION OF THE RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND
CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS ACT ("RICO")
ON THE PART OF DEFENDANT FLETCHER
149. Plaintiff incorporates each and every allegation elsewhere herein as if each were
set forth more fully hereafter verbatim.
150. This court has jurisdiction over violations of the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act.
151. Defendant Fletcher is believed to have engaged in racketeering activity within the
meaning of 18 U.S.C. §1961(1) including, but not limited to the following indictable offenses:
(a) the transmission by such Defendant, by means of wire communication in interstate
commerce, of writings, signals or sounds for the purpose of executing his scheme or
artifice to defraud Plaintiff and other investors similarly situated in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§1343;
(b) the use of the mails in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1341 to consummate this and/or a
similar scheme;
(c) fraud in the sale of securities; and/or
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(d) any offense involving fraud connected with a case under Title 11 U.S.C., namely
bankruptcy fraud.
152. The conduct of Defendant Fletcher as alleged herein constitutes a pattern of
racketeering within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. §1961(5) insofar as Defendant Fletcher
engaged in at least two acts of racketeering activity within the meaning of 18 U.S.C.
§1961(1) within the last ten (10) years.
153. Defendant Fletcher has received income derived, directly or indirectly, from a
pattern of rackeetering activity and/or has used or invested, directly or indirectly, part of
such income, or the proceeds of such income, in the acquisition of an interest in, and/or in
the establishment or operation of, an enterprise or enterprises which is or are engaged in,
or the activities of which affect interstate or foreign commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1962(a).
154. Defendant Fletcher has, through a pattern of racketeering activity, acquired and
maintained, directly or indirectly, an interest in or control of an enterprise or enterprises
which is or are engaged in, or the activities of which affect interstate of foreign commerce
in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1962(b).
155. Defendant Fletcher has, while employed by or associated with an enterprise,
engaged in, or the activities of which affect interstate commerce, conducted or
participated, directly or indirectly in the conduct of such enterprisers') affairs through a
pattern of racketeering activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1962(q}.

-

28 -

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

o/:

156. Defendant Fletcher has conspired with another (which may include the Insurance
Company Defendants) to violate the provisions of 18 U.S.C. §§1962(a),(b). and (c) in violation
of 18 U.S.C. §1962(d).
157. Plaintiff believes and asserts that Defendant Fletcher is a "person" and/or an
"enterprise" as the case may be as necessary to satisfy the technical pleading requirement
under the statute, particularly §1962(c), regarding such distinctions and Plaintiff asserts
that she presently lacks sufficient information to presently make a more particularized
distinction.
158. Defendant Fletcher aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured,
or willfully caused the commission of the racketeering activities, regardless of the
capacities in which he acted, and therefore, is liable as a principal in and to said activity
within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. §2.
159. Plaintiff has been injured in her business or property as a direct and proximate
result of Defendant Fletcher's violations of 18 U.S.C. §1962 in an amount in excess of
$40,000.00. the precise amount of which damages is not yet ascertained, but which will be
established at trial.
160. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1964(c), Plaintiff is entitled to recover from and against
Defendant Fletcher threefold the amount of the damages sustained by Plaintiff, in an
amount believed to be in excess of $40,000.00. to be proven on or before trial, plus the cost
of this suit, interest, and resonable attorney's fees.
WHEREFORE, on all of Plaintiff's causes of action, Plaintiff prays for trial by jury;
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1. On Counts I and II of Plaintiff's complaint, Plaintiff prays for judgment against
Defendants Atlas and Check-Rite in the amount of the highest price of the stock since May,
1988, an amount to be proven on or before trial and which Plaintiff calculates to be at least
$12,000.00, for costs, pre and post-judgment interest at the highest legal rate, attorney's
fees in accordance with §78-27-56, Utah Code Ann., and otherwise, and for any all further
relief as the court deems fair and equitable;
2. On Count III of Plaintiff's complaint, Plaintiff prays for judgment against all
Defendants with the exception of Defendant Fletcher in the amount of at least $12,000 to
be proven on or before trial, punitive damages of several thousand dollars, for costs, pre
and post-judgment interest at the highest legal rate, attorney's fees in accordance with
§78-27-56, Utah Code Ann., and otherwise, and for any and all further relief as the court
deems fair and equitable;
3. On Count IV of Plaintiff's complaint, Plaintiff prays for judgment against the
Insurance Company Defendants in the amount of the highest price that Check-Rite stock
has attained since May, 1988, which Plaintiff calculates to be at least $12,000.00, for costs,
pre and post-judgment interest at the highest legal rate, attorney's fees in accordance with
§78-27-56, Utah Code Ann., and otherwise, and for any and all further relief as the court
deems fair and equitable;
4. On Count V of Plaintiff's complaint, Plaintiff prays for judgment against the
Insurance Company Defendants in the amount of at least $12,000 to be proven on or before
trial, for punitive damages of at least $200,000.00, for costs, pre and post-judgment

-

30 -

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(K^/H

interest at the highest legal rate, attorney's fees in accordance with §78-27-56, Utah Code
Ann., and otherwise, and for any and all further relief as the court deems fair and equitable;

5. On Count VI of Plaintiff's complaint, Plaintiff prays for judgment against the
Insurance Company Defendants in amount to be determined on or before trial, for punitive
damages of at least $50,000.00, for costs, pre and post-judgment interest at the highest
legal rate, attorney's fees in accordance with §78-27-56, Utah Code Ann., and otherwise,
and for any and all further relief as the court deems fair and equitable;
6. On Count VII of Plaintiff's complaint, Plaintiff prays for judgment against
Defendants jointly and severally in an amount to be proven on or before trial, but which
includes all of the attorney's fees that Plaintiff has incurred in attempting to settle the
matter without litigation, for substantial punitive and exemplary damages as against all
Defendants jointly and severally, for costs, pre and post-judgment interest at the highest
legal rate, attorney's fees in accordance with §78-27-56, Utah Code Ann., and otherwise,
and for any and all further relief as the court deems fair and equitable;
7. On Count VIII of Plaintiff's complaint, Plaintiff prays for judgment against
Defendant Fletcher in an amount of her damages which Plaintiff believes to be at least
$12,000 and which further includes her needless incurring of substantial attorney's fees to
date, costs, pre and post-judgment interest at the highest legal rate, attorney's fees in
accordance with §78-27-56, Utah Code Ann., and otherwise, and for any and all further
relief as the court deems fair and equitable;
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8. On Count IX of Plaintiff's complaint, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendant
Fletcher in the amount of three times the consideration paid for the security, for costs, pre
and post-judgment interest at 12% per annum since September 1981, attorney's fees in
accordance with §78-27-56 and §61-1-22(1), Utah Code Ann., and for any and all further
relief as the court deems fair and equitable;
9. On Count X of Plaintiff's complaint, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendant
Fletcher in the amount of at least $12,000.00, including all attorney's fees that Plaintiff has
needlessly been required to incur, punitive damages of at least $250,000.00, for costs, pre
and post-judgment interest at the highest legal rate, attorney's fees in accordance with
§78-27-56, Utah Code Ann., and otherwise, and for any and all further relief as the court
deems fair and equitable;
10. On Count XI of Plaintiff's complaint, Plaintiff prays for judgment against
Defendant Fletcher for violation of any one of 18 U.S.C. §§1962(a),(b),(c), and/or (d) of the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act in an amount of at least $40,000.00,
for costs, reasonable attorney's fees as provided therein, pre and post-judgment interest
at the highest legal rate, and any and all further relief as the court deems fair and equitable.

DATED this 18th day of May, 1989.

Plaintiff's Address:
3576 Oak Rim Way
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
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NORTHWESTERN NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY
of Milwaukee, Wisconsin
Bond

Snoiu all Btcu by lljesc Presents, THAT

Scott J

N o . UMI 8 7 1 3 8 5

- Fletcher

is Principal and NORTHWESTERN NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY, a corporation organized and
exiting ujidtr the laws of the Slate of Wisconsin duly authorized to transact the business of indemnity and suretyship in the State of
and having an office and principal place of business in said Slate
D 2 5 E 4500 S, S a l t Lake C i t y ,
are held and firmly bound unto

at

Ut^ M

Surety

(hereinafter collectively calkd the

Obligors'),

Cardinal Energy Corporation
and
Atlas Stock Transfer
and unto ail such individuals, firms and corporations, as mny now and/or hereafter be acting as Transfer Agent(s)
and/or Registrar(s) of the below mentioned stock (hereinafter collectively called the * Obligees'), in an amount, pay.
able in lawful money of the United States, sufficient to indemnify the Obligees under the condition of this bond as
hereinafter set forth not to exceed, however, the maximum amount of risk which may be legally assumed by the Surety
under any law governing the validity or performance of this bond, to be paid lo the Obligees, and etch of them, and
to their respective legal representatives, successors and assigns, as interest may appear, for which payment well and
rul) lo be made, the Obligors do bind themselves, and their respective successors assigns, heirs and legal reprcscnta
tnes jointly and severally, firmly by these presents
SLALED with the seals of the Obligors and executed in
OJ

August

19

O^E counterparts, this

^3rd

^

82

WHEREAS, the Principal represents that said Principal is the owner of Cerlificate(s) No (s)

^58

representing 8.,000 shares of Cardinal Energy Corporation stock issued
June 17, 1981.

registered in the name of * ^
„Scott_ J, Fletcher
0<2> 5 9 1 0
(hereinafter called "old certificate(s)"} ; that the old certificate(s) ha s
been lost, de»lroved or stolen so that the
s«me cannot be found or produced, and that said Principal has not sold, pledged, hypothecated or otherwise trans
fcr/ed the old ccrtificale(s), or the shares represented thereb), or an) interest therein or right thereto
WHFREAS, the Obligees, in reliance upon said representations and at the request of the Obligors, arc willing to
issue and deliver a new certincate(s) in the place and stead of the old certificatc(s), upon the execution and delivery
o» this bond,
NOW, THERFFORE, the condition of this obligation is such that, if the Principal shall at all times indemnify
and keep indemnified and save harmless the Obligees, and each of them, and their respective legal representatives,
successors and assigns, from and against any and all actions and suits, whether groundless or otherwise, and from
ind^ again«t any and all losses, damages, costs, charges, counsel fees, payments, expenses and liabilities whatsoever,
wh*.h the Obligees, or any of them, or their respective legal representatives, successors or assigns, at on) time shall
orfraay sustain or incur (1) by reason of said issue and delivery of such new ccrtificate(s), or (2) bv reason of any
claun which may be made in respect of the old certificate(s), or (3) by reason of any payment, transfer, exchange or
otrur act v*h»ch said Obligees, or any of them, or their respective legal representatives, successors or assigns, may
Loake or do in respect of the old certificate(a), whether made or done through accident, oversight, or neglect, or whether
t tade or done upon presentation thereof without contesting the propriety of such payment, transfer, exchange or other
act, or (4) by reason of any other matter or ihing arising out of the recognition of the aforesaid request of the Obligors,
then this obligation shall be void, otherwise it shall remain in full force and effect
Trie Surely agrees that its liability hereunder shall be absolute, regardless of any liability of the Principal here
under, whether by reason of any irregular or unauthorized execution of, or failure to execute, this bond, or any absence
o< interest of the Principal in the subject matter hereof, or otherwise.
It u underrtood that the obligation hereby created in favor of any such Transfer Agent or Registrar shall not
be atfectc 1 by the termination of the agency of such Transfer Agent or Registrar.

Scott J. Fletcher
NotTHWiffrnN

NATIONAL

-(L 8 )

INSUI

iF«*
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AFFIDAVIT OF QUALIFICATION

STATE OF UTAH

)
) SS
:OUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

Thomas J, Brough, being first duly sworn, on oath desposes and says
that he is the ATTORNEY-IN-FACT of the NORTHWESTERN NATIONAL INSURANCE
COMPANY, and that he is duly authorized to execute and deliver the
foregoing obligations; that said company is authorized to execute
the same and has complied in all respects with the laws of Utah
in referenced to becoming sole Surety upon bond, undertakings and
obligations*

Thomas J. Br<Magh
Attorney-in-Fact

Subscribed and sworn to before me this

23rd

Day of

/

August, 1982

My Commission Expires.^MyAmissionCxpl^AprlllS. 1984
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NORTHWESTERN NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY
of Milwaukee, Wisconsin
Bond

No.

UMI

902168'

&uoiu oil illett by lljcse presents, THAT S c o t t J - Fletcher
as Principal and NORTHWESTERN NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY a corporation org-uw H nivl
existing under the Laws of the State of Wisconsin, duly authorized to transact the business of jrdcmnjty an J surety
ship in the State of . U t a h

^ j having an office and principal place of business in said State

at 5 2 5 E 4 5 0 0 S , S a l t
aie tuld and firmly bound unto

Lake

City,

U t as Surety (hereinafter collectively called the* Obligors'),

Cardinal Energy
and
Atlas Stock Transfer
and ui»(o all such individuals, firms and corporations, at may now ond/or hucafter be a< tinj as Irunsfer Agcnt(a)
and/or Ktgistrar(s) of the below mentioned stock, (hereinafter collectively tailed the "Obligees"), in an amount, payable in lawful money of the United States, sufficient to indemnify the Obligees under the condition of this bond as
hereinafter set forth, not to exceed, however, the maximum amount of risk which may be legall) assumed b) the burety
under an> law governing the validity or performance of this bond, to be paid lo the Obligees, and each of diem, and
to their respective legal representative*, successors and assigns, as interest may appear, for which pa)ineut well and
trul) to be made, the Obligors do bind themselves, and their respective successors, assigns, heirs and legal representative*, jointly and severally, firmly by these presents
SCAl LD with the seals of the Obligors and executed in

of

November

19

83

7WQ counterparts, tins

jr

2 3*"d

day

\^%

WULKEAS, the Principal represents that said Principal is the owner of Certificate(s) No (s)

6 76

r e p r e s e n t i n g 8,000 s h a r e s of C a r d i n a l Energy stock i s s u e d August 2 3. 1982

regislcied in tho name of
SCOtt J .
FletCO^r,
(hereinafter called "old certificate^)") , that the old certifieale(s) ha S.
been lost, destroyed or stolen so that the
»ame cunnol be found or produced, and that said Principal ban not sold, pledged, hypothecated or otherwise trans
ferred the old ccrlihcale(s), or the shares represented thereb), or any interest llierei'i or r»clit dicreto
W Hr 11 LAS, the Obligees, in reliance upon said representations and at the request of the Obligors, arc willing to
issue and drliver a new certificate(s) in the place and stead of the old ccrlincatc(s), upon the execution and delivery
of this bond,
NOW, IHCKErOflE, the condition of this obligation is suih that, if the Principal shall at all times indemnify
and keep indemnified and save harmless the Obligees, and each of them, and their respective legal representative*,
successor* and assigns, from and against any and all actions and suits, whether groundless or otheiwtsc, und from
an J i^unst in) otul all losses, damages, costs, churgea coiinst 1 fees, pa) incuts, expenses and liabilities whatsoever,
which tiic Obligees, or any of them, or their icspedive hgal rt prescnUlives, successors or assigns, at an> tune shall
or nn\ sustain or IIM ur (1) bv reason of said issue and delivcn of such urw rcrlificate(s) or (°» bv r< is« n ^f any
chiiu winch ma) be made in respect of the old certificates), or (J) by reason of any payment, transfer, exchange or
other act whuh said Obligees, or an) of them, or their respective lrgal representatives, *ucrc<sois or assigns, may
make or do in respect of the old ccrtificatc(s), whether made or done through accident, oversight, or neglect, or whether
made or dune upon presentation thereof without contesting the propriety of such pa) mini, transfer, exchange or other
v l >r ( t; Lyr« «.on «»f uny »»ih« r in atcr or tiling ari»»ng out of ''it rcrc in ion <>{ die -loi* t- d IC.JL* -.1 uf tlic Ol '.goi*,
then this obh 0 ation shall be void, otherwise it shall remain in full force and ctlcct
The Surtt) a^rrcs that its liability hereunder shall be absolute, regardless of any liability of the Principal here*
under, whether by reason of any irregular or unauthorized execution of, or failure to execute, this bond, or any absence
of interest of the Pnncipal in the subject matter hereof, or otherwise.
It is untieistood that the obligation hereby created in favor of any such Tiansfer Agent or Registrar shall not
be affected by the termination of the agency of such Tronsfer Agent ©rjtegislrar
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EXHIBIT.
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Ti)0

AFFIDAVIT OF QUALIFICATION

STATE OF UTAH

)
) SS
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

Thomas J. Brough, being first duly sworn, on oath desposes and says
that he is the ATTORNEY-IN-FACT of the NORTHWESTERN NATIONAL INSURANCE
COMPANY, and that he is duly authorized to execute and deliver the
foregoing obligations; that said company is authorized to execute
the same and has complied in all respects with the laws of Utah
in referenced to becominq sole Surety upon bondf undertakings and
obligations.

Thonfas J. Brou
Attorney-in-Fadt

Subscribed and sworn to before me this

23rd Day of

November, 19 8 3

My Commission Expires:

,£)tAsn,fr££/
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NORTHWESTERN NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY
off Milwaukee, Wisconsin
$tU0lD a l l BleU l>{| UjC0C l)rC0Clll0, THAT

Bond

N o . UMI

8 8 0 7 35

Jeannejinder

as Principal, and N O R T H W E S T E R N N A T I O N A L I N S U R A N C E COMPANY, a corporation organized and
existing under the laws of trie State of Wisconsin, duly authorized to transact the business of indemnity and suretyship in the State of
„....?..
and having an office and principal place of business in said State
at 5 2 5 E 4 5 °.° . : S / . ? a \ L ^ * \ ? - . .
are held and firmly bound unto

Cardinal

C

A^I L. Vt as Surety (hereinafter collectively called the "Obligors"),

Energy

and unto all such individual?, firms and corporations, as may now and/or hereafter be acting as Transfer Agent(s)
und/or Registrar (s) of the below-mentioned stock (hereinafter collectively called the "Obligees"), in an amount, payable in lawful money of the United States, sufficient to indemnify the Obligees under the condition of this bond as
hereinafter set fordi, not to exceed, however, the maximum amount of risk which may be legally assumed by the Surety
under any law governing the validity or performance of this bond, to be paid to the Obligees, and each of them, and
to their respective legal representative*, successors and assigns, as interest may appear; for which payment well and
truly to be made, the Obligors do bind themselves, and their respective successors, assigns, heirs and legal representatives, jointly and severally, firmly by these presents,
,
ONE
SEALED with the seals of the Obligors and executed in
counterparts, this

, December

1 4 t h

,^ 82

of

, 19

WHEREAS, the Principal represents that said Principal is the owner of Certificate(s) No.(s)

representing 2,000 shares of Cardinal Enerav stock

*vixN
It

EXHIRIT
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day

OTTOO
existing ^nacr^huTiaws

ol t i i e ^ S k n e ^ P W l ^

ship in the State of

Utah

.aeaa'bfinaemiiuy anu &uieiyan(j

525 E 4500 S, S a l t
are held and firmly bound unto

at

Lake C i t y ,

j^y^g
Ut

a8

a n

office

anc]

principal place of business in said State

Surety (hereinafter collectively called the "Obligors"),

Cardinal Energy

and unto all such individuals, firms a**d corporations, as may now and/or heicafter be acting as Transfer Agent(s)
and/or Regibtrar(s) of the below-mentioned stock (hereinafter collectively called the "Obligees"), in an amount, payable in lawful money of the United States, sufficient to indemnify the Obligees under the condition of this bond as
hereinafter set forth, not to exceed, however, the maximum amount of risk which may be legally assumed by the Surely
under any law governing the validity or performance of this bond, to be paid to the Obligees, and each of them, and
to iheir respective legal representatives, successors and assigns, as interest may appear; for which payment well and
truly to be made, the Obligors do bind themselves, and their respective successors, assigns, heirs and legal representatives, jointly and severally, firmly by these presents.
SEALED with the seals of the Obligors and executed in
of

December

., 19.

ONE

.
counterparts, this

14th

82

WHEREAS, the Principal represents that said Principal is the owner of Certificate(s) No.(s).

representinq
*v^

day

2 # 000 s h a r e s of C a r d i n a l E n e r a y

568

stock

V

registered in the name of
-. £ ? E ? l » i ^ e I
(hereinafter called "old certificate(s)"); that the old ccrtificate(s) ha
been lost, destroyed or stolen so that the
j-.ime cannot be found or produced; and that said Princip.il has not sold, pledged, hypothecated or otherwise transferred the old ccrlificalc(s), or the shares represented thereby, or any interest therein or right thereto.
W11EHEAS, the Obligees, in reliance upon said representations and at the request of the Obligors, arc willing to
issue and deliver a new certificate(s) in the place and stead of the old certificate(s), upon the execution and delivery
of this bond;
NOW, THEREFORE, the condition of this obligation is such that, if the Principal shall at nil times indemnify
and keep indemnified and save harmless the Obligees, and each of them, and their respective legal representatives,
surr<->sors and assigns, from and against any and all actions and suits, whether groundless or othciwise, and from
and against any and all losses, damages, costs, charges, counsel fees, payments, expenses and liabilities vthaUocver,
which the Obligees, or any of themK or their ies[>ective legal representatives, successors or assign*, at any time shall
or may sustain or incur (1) by reason of said issue and delivery of such new certificate(s), or (2) by reason of any
claim uhiih may be mad*! in respect of the old certificate(s), or (3) by reason of any payment, transfer, exchange 4M*
other act which said Obligees, or any of them, or their respective legal representatives, successors or assigns, may
make or do in respect of the old certificate^), whether made or done through accident, oversight, or neglect, or whether
made or done upon presentation thereof without contesting the propriety of such payment, transfer, exchange or other
act, or (4) by reason of any other matter or thing arising out of the recognition of the aforesaid request of the Obligors,
then this obligation shall be void; odierwise it shall remain in full force and effect.
The Surety agrees that its liability hereunder shall be absolute, regardless of any liability of the Principal hereunder, whether by reason of any irregular or unauthorized execution of, or failure lo execute, this bond, or any absence
of interest of the Principal in the subject matter hereof, or otherwise.
It is understood that the obligation hereby created in favor of any such Transfer Agent or Registrar shall not
be affected by the termination of the agency of such Transfer Agent or Registrar.

^^^s^ctc^TS

s2-
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ATLAS STOCK TRANSFER
C O R P O R A T I O N

May 4 ,

1988

LeAnna Broadwater
3576 Oak Rim Way
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
RE:

Checkrite International

Dear Ms. Broadwater:
Enclosed please find a photocopy of Cardinal
Energy Corporation certificate number SL-0000258
for 8,000 shares registered in the name of Scott
J. Fletcher.
This certificate was reported lost and in
lieu of which a new security was issued unde^r
a bond of indemnity dated Aug. 23, 1982. Therefore, we must refuse your request for registration,
and propose to retain and cancel this certificate.
Very truly yours,

Franklin L. Kimball
Transfer Agent
FLK:pg
Enclosures

it

EXHIBIT
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July 11, 1988

Mr. Paul S. Guardatabene
Old Republic Insurance Co.
P. 0. Box 1635
Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53201
Dear Mr. Guardatabene:
Pursuant to our telephone conversation of last week, this
letter will confirm my purchase of 8,000 shares of Check
Rite International (formerly Cardinal Energy) from Potter
Investment Company, Salt Lake City, Utah, on September 21 f
1981. The certificate which was delivered to me by
Potter Investment Company was #258, in the name of Scott
J. Fletcher, 9916 Petunia V7ay, Sandy, Utah 84092. The
amount I paid for the stock at that time was $.31.
As I indicated to you on the phone, I purchased this stock
in good faith from Potter Investment Company for investment
purposes, and I will in no way accept what you proposed as
far as settling with me for my original purchase price.
After further consideration, I feel that it would be in
everyone's best interests to simply replace the stock so
that I will be free to sell it whenever I choose. The
market seems to be firming up on said stock, so Sotfee^uentl
this matter should be resolved as quickly as possible.
I look forward to hearing from you in the very near future.
Sincerely,

LeAnna Broadwater
3576 Oak Rim Way
Salt Lake City, Utah
Phone: (801) 277-3068
lb

EXHIBIT
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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July 27, 1983

Mr. Paul S. Guardalabene
Old PepublicSSurety Company
P. 0. Eox 1635
Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53201
Dear Mr. Guardalabene:
Regarding our telephone conversation of today, enclosed
please find documents which should clarify my position
and status with KASU Securities, Inc. and the fact that
I am the legal owner of the 8,000 shares of Check-Rite
International (formerly Cardinal Energy).
I have high-lighted the pertinent information on enclosed
documents for your convenience.
As I stated to you today, the subject stock is now trading
at $1*00 and could continue to go much higher.
I will be waiting to hear from you soon.
Sincerely,

LeAnna Broadwater
3576 Oak Rim Way
Salt Lake City, Utah
Phone: (801) 277-3068
lb
end.

EXHIBIT
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SECURITIES, INC.
Monfvr SASD*

SUV

Mr. J. Michael Coombs
72 East 400 South Suite 220
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
November 25, 1988
Dear Mr. Coombs:
This letter is in response to your inquiring today
regarding the market action of CHECK RITE INTERNATIONAL
formerly Cardinal Energy.
Our firm is a primary market maker and has provided
a continuous quotation for this stock to the investment
community and the National Quotation Bureau. In
researching our records, I find that CHECKRITE INTERNATIONAL had a high trade of $1.25 per share on July
28, 1988.
Sijxe^f^l;

EM/ka

EXHIBIT.
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Third Jui -uioiiuict

ftb 1 0 b IS$Q
JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS. No. 3639
Attorney for Plaintiff
72 East 400 South. Suite 220
Salt Lake City. Utah 84111
Telephone No.: (801) 359-0833

Deputy Cterk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH

LeANNA BROADWATER.
AFFIDAVIT OF ERNEST MUTH
Plaintiff.
v.
OLD REPUBLIC SURETY, a Wisconsin
corporation doing business in
Utah. NORTH WESTERN NATIONAL
INSURANCE COMPANY OF MILWAUKEE.
WISCONSIN, a Wisconsin
corporation, doing business in
Utah. ATLAS STOCK TRANSFER, a
Utah Corporation. CHECK RITE
INTERNATIONAL INC.. f/k/a
CARDINAL ENERGY CORPORATION, a
Utah corporation, and SCOTT J.
FLETCHER, a Utah resident,

Civil No. 89-0902684-CV
Judge Raymond S. Uno
:

Defendants.
STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY

)
)ss.
)

Ernest Muth on his oath deposes and says as follows:
1. That your affiant is a stock broker employed by Bagley Securities. Inc., and
for several years he has been a registered representative with the National Association of

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Securities Dealers, Inc., fNASD") and the Utah Securities Division. That he has personal
knowledge and experience as to that which is contained herein.
2. That your affiant's firm, Bagley Securities, Inc.. undertook transactions in
the securities of Check-Rite fromjrfsty through August, 1988. That based on official
records in the possession of Bagley Securities which your affiant has examined, the
following is a list of the highest prices that the stock of Check-Rite was either bought or
sold by Bagley Securities for the period(s) so indicated:
MAY. 1988:
HIGHEST
PRICE
FIRST WEEK:
SECOND WEEK:
THIRD WEEK:
FOURTH WEEK:
JUNE, 1988:
HIGHEST
*PRICE_
FIRST WEEK:
SECOND WEEK:
THIRD WEEK:
FOURTH WEEK:

jtlL

.-bo

jJLo.

JULY. 1988:
HIGHEST
PRICE
FIRST WEEK:
SECOND WEEK:
THIRD WEEK:
FOURTH WEEK:

$1.25

AUGUST. 1988:
HIGHEST
PRICE
FIRST WEEK:
SECOND WEEK:

-2Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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THIRD WEEK:

tOo^^M^*?

FOURTH WEEK:

Do T E M > C < T

3. To your affiant's best knowledge and belief, the highest price that the stock
traded in Salt Lake City in 1988 was $1.25 per share as evidenced by Exhibit "A" attached
hereto and incorporated by reference, a true and correct copy of a Bagley Securities stock
confirmation.
4. That Plaintiff LeAnna Broadwater has a brokerage account with your affiant
and during the latter part of July and the beginning of August. 1988. your affiant was in
regular communication with her about the price of Check Rite stock. That your affiant
believes and is informed that if Ms. Broadwater had had a certificate of Check Rite to
deliver, she would have sold it during the end of July or early August. 1988 when the price of
the Company's stock achieved its highest price in 1988.
FURTHER SAITH AFFIANT NAUGHT.
'SEDATED this*Z.\ day of January. 1990

Ernest/vluth

x

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before Me

?

t&ry Kibiic
siding at Salt Lake City. UT

My commission txpires:

AFDVT.3
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JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS, No. 3639
Attorney for Plaintiff
72 East 400 South, Suite 220
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone No.: (801) 359-0833

IN T H E T H I R D JUDICIAL DISTRICT C O U R T IN A N D FOR
S A L T LAKE C O U N T Y , S T A T E O F U T A H

LeANNA B R O A D W A T E R .

AFFIDAVIT OF CHUCK BURTON
Plaintiff,
v.
OLD REPUBLIC SURETY, a Wisconsin
corporation doing business in
Utah. NORTH WESTERN NATIONAL
INSURANCE COMPANY OF MILWAUKEE,
WISCONSIN, a Wisconsin
corporation, doing business in
Utah. ATLAS STOCK TRANSFER, a
Utah Corporation. CHECK RITE
INTERNATIONAL INC.. f / k / a CARDINAL
ENERGY CORPORATION, a Utah
corporation, and SCOTT J.
FLETCHER, a Utah resident.

Civil No. 89-0902684-CV
Judge Raymond S. Uno

Defendants.

STATE OF COLO.
)ss.
COUNTY OF
Chuck Burton, on his oath, deposes and says as follows:
1. That your affiant has personal knowledge of that which is contained herein.
That during July and August 1988 your affiant was employed as an account executive with
•KoVw ifiiiTBHKHtri, a securities broker-dealer in Denver, Colorado.

tUj
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2. That during the time your affiant was an account executive with-£ebef-

L^?urfc

(e$\
v

FwanotQl, it made a "market" in the stock of Check Rite International, Inc.

—y

3. That your affiant recalls a conversation he had with Plaintiff LeAnna
Broadwater some time in July 1988 in which she sought a quote on the stock of Check Rite.
4. That your affiant specifically recalls a transaction at Kuber Financial in

fc iyf.

which a sale of Check Rite stock occurred at $1 3/8 per share, exclusive of commissions.
5. That your affiant blieves and recalls that such transaction occurred at July
1988 end or early August 1988 and such was soon after your affiant's telephone
conversation with Plaintiff LeAnna Broadwater.
FURTHER SAITH AFFIANT NAUGHT.
DATED this (8_day of .Aa§t»t. 1989.

uck Burton
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me thisi8th day of /%u§tts% 1989.

3rf

Notary Public
Residing at Denver, Colorado

My Commission Expires:

<$T/m£ <5? CobuAsfaj
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JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS, No. 3639
Attorney for Plaintiff
72 East 400 South, Suite 220
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone No.: (801) 359-0833

-

-,/.,«»«

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

LeANNA BROADWATER,
AFFIDAVIT OF POTTER
INVESTMENT COMPANY

Plaintiff,
V.

OLD REPUBLIC SURETY, a Wisconsin
corporation doing business in
Utah, NORTH WESTERN NATIONAL
INSURANCE COMPANY OF MILWAUKEE,
WISCONSIN, a Wisconsin
corporation, doing business in
Utah, ATLAS STOCK TRANSFER, a
Utah Corporation, CHECK RITE
INTERNATIONAL INC., f/k/a
CARDINAL ENERGY CORPORATION, a
Utah corporation, and SCOTT J.
FLETCHER, a Utah resident,

Civil No. 89-0902684-CV
Judge Raymond S. Uno

Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY

)
)ss.
)

George "John" Potter, being first put on his oath deposes and says as follows
on behalf of Potter Investment Company:
1. That your affiant is a principal of the securities brokerage firm here in Salt
Lake City known as Potter Investment Company. That your affiant has power and authority

-1 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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to make this affidavit on behalf of Potter Investment Company. That since the 1950's your
affiant has been in the securities brokerage business and he has been a registered
representative with the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., ("NASD") and the
Utah Securities Division. That he has personal knowledge and experience as to that which is
contained herein.
2. That Potter Investment Company bought certificate 258 from defendant
Scott J. Fletcher and sold the same to plaintiff LeAnna Broadwater. That such certificate
was properly endorsed by Fletcher and properly signature guaranteed as required in the
industry. In the industry such a certificate is known as "street stock" and it was delivered to
and accepted by plaintiff Broadwater on the settlement date of her purchase transaction
with Potter Investment Company. That because Potter Investment Company received
valuable consideration from Ms. Broadwater for her purchase of 8,000 shares of Check
Rite, Potter Investment Company has and would have had no dispute as to whether Ms.
Broadwater then became the true and lawful owner of certificate 258.
3. That sometime in mid-1988, Potter Investment Company learned about
plaintiff's problem with respect to her request of Atlas Stock Transfer, Check Rite's
transfer agent, to transfer and register Check Rite certificate 258 into her name.
4. That sometime in the end of June or the first week of July 1988 your affiant
recalls engaging in a telephone conversation with an individual who identified himself as
Paul S. Guardalabene and who further identified himself as an employee or agent of Old
Republic Surety, the insurance company that had written a lost instrument bond on Check
Rite certificate 258. That your affiant had a lengthy discussion with Mr. Guardalabene
about penny stocks and lost instrument bonds, etc., one that lasted probably at least 30

-2-
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minutes or more. That during such conversation with Mr. Guardalabene, your affiant
informed Mr. Guardalabene that penny stocks such as Check Rite were highly volatile and it
was your affiant's suggestion to Mr. Guardalabene that it would be in Guardalabene's best
interest to quickly resolve any dispute with plaintiff LeAnna Broadwater as the stock could
appreciate in value.
FURTHER SAITH AFFIANT NAUGHT.
DATED this /1 day of February, 1990.
/ I

V /

George "Jbhnf Patter
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before

Residing at Salt Lake City, UT
My Commission Expires:

AFDVT.!
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JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS, No. 3639
Attorney for Plaintiff
72 East 400 South, Suite 220
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone No.: (801) 359-0833

'fifi

^— i n *

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

LeANNA BROADWATER.
SUPPORTING AFFIDAVIT OF
PENNY G. GRACE

Plaintiff,
v.
OLD REPUBLIC SURETY, a Wisconsin
corporation doing business in
Utah. NORTH WESTERN NATIONAL
INSURANCE COMPANY OF MILWAUKEE,
WISCONSIN, a Wisconsin
corporation, doing business in
Utah, ATLAS STOCK TRANSFER, a
Utah Corporation, CHECK RITE
INTERNATIONAL INC., f/k/a
CARDINAL ENERGY CORPORATION, a
Utah corporation, and SCOTT J.
FLETCHER, a Utah resident.

Civil No. 89-0902684-CV
Judge Raymond S. Uno

Defendants.

Attached hereto in support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment on
Counts I and II of her Amended Complaint is the Affidavit of Penny G. Grace, Assistant Vice
President of Thomson McKinnon Securities, Inc.
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THOMSON
/VfWN^ON
/VfWNNONSECURfllESINC
333 CHESTERFIELD CENTER BLDG., SUITE 100, CHESTERFIELD, MISSOURI 63017

314 532-2400

August 8, 1989

Mr, Michael Coombs
72 East-400 South
Suite 220
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Dear Mr. Coombs:
In regard to your inquiry on the Checkrite stock, I can
attest to the fact that I have been purchasing Checkrite
stock for clients since September 17, 1987. I have
purchased these shares for clients at various prices. The
highest price I paid for the stock was at 1-5/16 on
July 28, 1988 when I purchased 20,000 shares of Checkrite
for various clients.
I have enclosed my business card.
I can be of further assistance.

Please let me know if

Very truly yours,

l
Penny G. Grace
Asst. Vice President

PGG/kk
STATE OF

/

tfsi*«rJ

COUNTY OF
5T*^Cmj
PENNY GRACE BEING DULY SWORN, DEPOSES AND SAYS THAT SHE PERSONALLY
APPEARED BEFORE ME AND SWORE TO THE ABOVE STATEMENT ON THIS

JVt DAY OF ^ 7 / "

W^

UBLI~
NOTARY PUBLIC
MY COMMISSIONS EXPIRES / # / y

.^f

/rf^tf
•
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JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS. No. 3639
Attorney for Plaintiff
72 East 400 South, Suite 220
Salt Lake City. Utah 84111
Telephone No.: (801) 359-0833

''
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH

LeANNA BROADWATER.
AFFIDAVIT OF PLAINTIFF IN
SUPPORT OF HER MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON COUNTS
I AND II OF HER AMENDED
COMPLAINT

Plaintiff.
v.
OLD REPUBLIC SURETY, a Wisconsin
corporation doing business in
Utah, NORTH WESTERN NATIONAL
INSURANCE COMPANY OF MILWAUKEE,
WISCONSIN, a Wisconsin
corporation, doing business in
Utah, ATLAS STOCK TRANSFER, a
Utah Corporation. CHECK RITE
INTERNATIONAL INC., f/k/a
CARDINAL ENERGY CORPORATION, a
Utah corporation, and SCOTT J.
FLETCHER, a Utah resident,

Civil No. 89-0902684-CV
Judge Raymond S. Uno

Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY

)
)ss.
)

LeAnna Broadwater, on her oath, deposes and says as follows in Support of
her Motion for Summary Judgment on Counts I and II of her Amended Complaint:
1. That your affiant is the sole plaintiff in the above-matter and she has
personal knowledge and experience as to that which is contained herein.
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2. That your affiant has carefully read and helped prepare the Statement of
Undisputed Facts in her Memorandum in Support of her Motion for Summary Judgment on
counts I and II of her Amended Complaint and in fact, she personally participated in the
drafting thereof. That in an effort not to duplicate each of such enumerated Facts as
detailed therein in this affidavit, your affiant can attest that each and every such Statement
of Undisputed Fact therein as it pertains to her and her knowledge and experience as to
how she was mistreated, misled, and "lulled" by certain of the defendants and, as to what
otherwise transpired in this case, is true and correct in all particulars.
3. That your affiant can attest that had she had a replacement certificate for
Certificate 258 at July-end/August beginning 1988 she would have sold it. She further
believes that she would have received the highest price that such stock reached in 1988,
namely, $1-5/16ths per share, or, at a minimum, at least $1.25 per share. This is because
your affiant knew of a pending Check Rite merger and she also had a brokerage account
with Ernest Muth and was daily, if not very closely, following the price of the stock at that
time. For instance, your affiant would have had an open order placed in which to sell the
stock at that time. On the other hand, your affiant believes that had she had a replacement
certificate at such time, she may have well received $1-5/16ths per share as set forth in the
supporting affidavit of Penny Grace. Thus, your affiant believes that she is entitled to at
least $10,000 in damages (8,000 shares x $1.25 per share) and perhaps $10,500 in damages
(8,000 shares x $1-5/16ths per share). Your affiant further believes that she is entitled to
pre-judgment interest at the highest legal rate or at a rate of no less that 12% and in her
Amended Complaint she has indeed asked for pre-judgment interest. Lastly, your affiant
has incurred attorney fees of at least $10,000 just trying to protect and enforce her rights,
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and she believes that such incurred fees have caused her additional damage which would
not have occured but for the wrongful conduct of the insurance company defendants and
defendants Atlas and Check Rite.
4. That your affiant believes that the defendants (with the exception of
defendant Fletcher) had a duty to make her whole, a duty which included immediately going
out into the market in May 1988 and buying 8,000 shares of stock to replace Certificate 258
on which a lost instrument bond had been posted. That the misfortune of this entire case is
that no responsible entity or person would help your affiant in any way and no one wanted
to take responsibility for the problem until there was nothing left to do but file a lawsuit —
and even then, the defendants would rather spend more money litigating this case than
giving your affiant what she truly deserves.
5. That your affiant believes that Guardalabene's investigation of the matter
was exclusively for his own employer and Fletcher, the principal on the bond, and had
nothing to do with her inasmuch as she is and was a totally innocent victim. That your
affiant believes that Atlas, Check Rite, and the insurance company defendants have no
excuse not to have immediately purchased 8,000 shares of replacement stock in May 1988
and thereafter and immediately delivered the same to her.
6. That your affiant does not believe that she had an obligation to go out and
"cover", namely, to go out into the market herself and with her own money buy replacement
stock for four reasons: (1) the problem was not her fault, (2) no one ever told her to "cover"
or do anything else at any time, (3) she did not have the resources or cash on hand to have
so bought replacement stock herself, and (4) she was not "short" the stock herself, namely,
she had not sold it to or by or through anyone else and therefore she had no duty herself to
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deliver 8,000 shares of replacement stock to any third party. That your affiant believes that
had she been "short" 8,000 shares herself then she arguably would have had a duty to
"cover", but under the circumstances of this case, she did not. That if anyone involved in
the case had simply informed your affiant that your affiant should have "covered" — just to
avoid this lawsuit your affiant would have done so. Unfortunately, no one did and your
affiant had no reason to think she was acting other than as reasonably as could be
expected of anyone.
7. That your affiant has incurred additional damages of substantial
unwarranted attorney fees, costs, including out-of-pocket expenses, and time expended
and she believes that she is entitled to such additional damages on which there should be an
evidentiary hearing.
FURTHER SAITH AFFIANT NAUGHT.
DATED t h i s ^ d a y of February, 1990.

LeAnna Broadwater! Plaintiff
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me t h i £ / ' / c l a y ^ F e b r v t a r v / f e a

NarafyPffblic
Residing at Salt Lake City, UT
My Commission Expires:

B:AFUVT.8
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JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS, No. 3639
Attorney for Plaintiff
72 East 400 South, Suite 220
Salt Lake City. Utah 84111
Telephone No.: (801) 359-0833

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

LeANNA BROADWATER.
Plaintiff.

AFFIDAVIT OF PLAINTIFF IN
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

OLD REPUBLIC SURETY, a Wisconsin
corporation doing business in
Utah. NORTH WESTERN NATIONAL
INSURANCE COMPANY OF MILWAUKEE.
WISCONSIN, a Wisconsin
corporation, doing business in
Utah, ATLAS STOCK TRANSFER, a
Utah Corporation, CHECK RITE
INTERNATIONAL INC., f/k/a
CARDINAL ENERGY CORPORATION, a
Utah corporation, and SCOTT J.
FLETCHER, a Utah resident,

Civil No. 89-0902684-CV
Judge Raymond S. Uno

Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY

)
)ss.
)

LeAnna Broadwater, on her oath, deposes and says as follows in opposition to
certain defendants' February 6, 1990, motion for partial summary judgment on Counts I and
II of her amended complaint:
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1. That your affiant is the sole plaintiff in the above-matter and she has
personal knowledge and experience as to that which is contained herein. That your affiant
incorporates by reference her affidavit filed in support of her cross-motion for summary
judgment on Counts I and II of her Amended Complaint.
2. That your affiant disputes the defendants' calculation of a "reasonable time"
as set forth in their memorandum in support of their motion for partial summary judgment.
That your affiant believes that she could not have acted more reasonably under the facts
and circumstances of this case and she believes that defendants Atlas, Check Rite,
Northwestern National, and Old Republic did not. That in fact, none of the responsible
parties would assist herr or do anything to resolve the problem and in fact there was nothing
she could do under the circumstances other than eventually file this lawsuit.
3. That your affiant believes that the conduct of the above-mentioned
defendants "lulled" her into thinking that they would resolve the matter when they would not
and did not, and if the Court invokes a "reasonable time" period after the conversion and
notice of conversion, such a period should be tolled or extended by virtue of the
misconduct of the above-named defendants — certainly not by any conduct on your
affiant's part. That less than 90 days after the alleged date of conversion is a "reasonable
time" in this case because your affiant acted reasonably during all that period and she does
not know how it is possible that she could have acted more reasonably or diligently. That
your affiant believes that no reasonable person in her shoes would have acted any
differently and certainly no one, under the same circumstances, would have thought that he
or she had an independent duty to effect "cover" and buy replacement stock, especially
when no defendant informed your affiant of such and such only became an issue after this
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case was filed. That your affiant believes that no reasonable person would have spent
several thousand dollars of his or her own money buying replacement stock when any such
person, and your affiant in particular, is the sole victim of the gross negligence,
malfeasance, misfeasance, and overall intentional conduct of the defendants.
4. Because your affiant acted reasonably and the culpable defendants did not,
a "reasonable time" after the conversion and notice of conversion should include a time
period up to and until July end/August beginning 1988 when the price of Check Rite stock
admittedly attained its highest price of $1-5/16th per share.
5. Lastly, your affiant should add that during one conversation with
Guardalabene, Guardalabene tried to get your affiant to deal directly with Fletcher to
resolve the problem. Your affiant responded that she did not think such was her
responsibility. At that point, Guardalabene informed your affiant that because she was a
"layman" and apparently didn't understand the situation, she should get a lawyer. Your
affiant then understood Guardalabene to say that he would no longer deal with her directly
until she consulted with legal counsel and had him talk directly to Guardalabene. Your
affiant can attest that after she retained counsel, who in fact tried to negotiate
unsuccessfully with Guardalabene, Guardalabene was still unwilling to resolve the problem
and therefore, Guardalabene caused your affiant to incur unwarranted and unjustified
attorney fees, not only prior to filing suit, but thereafter as well.
FURTHER SAITH AFFIANT NAUGHT.
DATED this/Tclay of February, 1990.
/ ^
LeAnna Broadwater, Plaintiff
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me t h i s / J cfey of February 1990
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My Commission Expires:

B:AFDVT.9 '
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Robert A. Burton, #0516
Stephen J. Trayner, #4928
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Defendants
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7080
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
LeANNA BROADWATER
AFFIDAVIT OF PAUL S.
GUARDALABENE

Plaintiff,
vs.
OLD REPUBLIC SURETY, a Wisconsin
corporation doing business in
Utah, NORTHWESTERN NATIONAL
INSURANCE COMPANY OF MILWAUKEE,
WISCONSIN, a Wisconsin corporation, doing business in Utah,
ATLAS STOCK TRANSFER, a Utah

Civil No, 89-0902684-CV
Honorable Raymond S. Uno

corporation, CHECK RITE INTERNATIONAL, INC. f/k/a CARDINAL
ENERGY CORPORATION, a Utah

corporation, and SCOTT J.
FLETCHER, a Utah resident,
Defendants.
STATE OF WISCONSIN
COUNTY OF

: SS
)

Affiant, Paul S. Guardalabene, having been first duly
sworn, deposes and states as follows:
1. Affiant is a resident of the State of Wisconsin and
is at least 18 years of age.
2.

At all times pertinent affiant has served as
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

assistant claim attorney for Old Republic Surety Company,
3.

Affiant is responsible for supervising the claims

handling process with respect to bond no. UMI 871385, and is
authorized by Old Republic Surety to testify as to the facts set
forth in this affidavit.
4.

In preparation of this affidavit, affiant has

personally reviewed the claims file maintained at the offices of
Old Republic Surety on bond no. UMI 871385.
5. Affiant is aware that the documents found in said
claims file are prepared in the normal course and scope of
defendant's business and reflect transactions or occurrences
contemporaneous to the entries found in said file.
6.

Defendant Old Republic received first notice of a

potential claim being made on bond no. UMI 871385 on or about May
20, 1988. On that date, Old Republic!s Salt Lake Office notified
the home office of a potential claim on the bond.
7.

See Exhibit 1.

On or about May 24, 1988, affiant spoke with

defendant Scott Fletcher concerning the potential claim being
made on the bond.
8.

On or about May 25, 1988, affiant wrote to Mr.

Fletcher, requesting that he contact "the necessary parties to
determine what happened and what can be done to settle this
claim".

See Exhibit 2.

-2Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

9.

On June 13, 1988, affiant corresponded with counsel

for Mr. Fletcher requesting his assistance.

See Exhibit 3.

10. On or about July 19, 1988, affiant received
plaintiff's July 11, 1988 correspondence advising affiant of
plaintiff's interest in the subject stock certificate and
informing affiant that the market for said stock appeared to be
"firming up".

See Exhibit 4.

11. On or about July 20, 1988, affiant corresponded with
counsel for Mr. Fletcher requesting that Fletcher respond to
plaintiff's most recent letter.

See Exhibit 5.

12. On or about August 1, 1988, affiant received
plaintiff's July 27, 1988 correspondence in which she supplied
various documents evidencing her alleged ownership of the subject
stock certificates.

The materials supplied by plaintiff included

reference to a Kasu Securities, Inc., a securities business in
which plaintiff was serving as president and treasurer.

See

Exhibit 6.
13. On August 8, 1988, affiant corresponded with
plaintiff clearly indicating that Old Republic would handle its
liability on the bond directly with the obligees under the bond.
See Exhibit 7.
14. On or about August 11, 1988, affiant corresponded
with Mr. Franklin L. Kimball of the Atlas Stock Transfer Co.
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concerning a potential claim being made under bond no, UMI
871385, a copy of this correspondence was sent to plaintiff.

See

Exhibit 8.
15.

On or about August 23, 1988, affiant received an

August 18, 1988 letter from Mr. Franklin L. Kimball of the Atlas
Stock Transfer Corp., detailing the trading history of Cardinal
Energy Corp. certificate no. 258.
16.

See Exhibit 9.

On or about August 29, 1988, affiant once again

corresponded with Mr. Franklin L. Kimball, a copy of his
correspondence is once again being sent to plaintiff.

See

Exhibit 10.
17.

On or about September 26, 1988, affiant received a

demand letter from plaintifffs current counsel, John Michael
Coombs.

See Exhibit 11.
18.

During the course of the claim history on bond no.

UMI 871385, affiant recalls only two telephone conversations with
plaintiff.
19.

Affiant recalls that plaintiff contacted him by

telephone sometime in June 1988 to discuss the stop transfer
order issued by Atlas Stock Transfer Corp.
20.

During the initial June 1988 conversation, affiant

indicated that he would appreciate any assistance that plaintiff
might give him investigating the matter further. Affiant
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indicated that he would need various documents from plaintiff and
other individuals before he could formally resolve any claim by
an obligee on the bond.
21.

Since plaintiff represented herself to affiant as

the holder of the lost security, affiant requested that plaintiff
submit any documentation that she might have that would confirm
her ownership of certificate no, 258.
22.

On or about July 27, 1988, plaintiff once again

telephoned affiant to confirm that the documentation she had
gathered would be sufficient for his needs.
23.

At no time did affiant ever inform plaintiff that

she was an obligee or a third-party beneficiary under the bond.
24.

At no time did affiant consider it his duty to

inform plaintiff of any legal duty or obligations that she might
have as an interested party in the matter.
25.

At all times during their dealings, affiant

considered plaintiff as an interested party who might be willing
to assist him in investigating the facts and circumstances
surrounding the appearance of the lost security.
26.

At no time during my dealings with plaintiff did

affiant indicate or infer that plaintiff had a right to recover
any damages directly from Old Republic.
27.

At no time during affiant's dealings with plaintiff
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did affiant intend to or do anything to stall or delay the claims handling
process

and the ultimate resolution

of the potential

obligees' claims

under the subject bond.
28.

At no time did affiant intend that any of his actions lull

plaintiff into inaction with respect to any legal duties or obligations
she might have had to enter the market place in order to mitigate her
damages.
DATED this « ^ / ^ d a y of ^ / ^ ^ , 1990.

Patul S. Guardalabene

Subscribed and sworn to before me t h i s ^ ^ d a y of ^Vu^y^y

H

> 1990.

/

Rotary Public
^Residing at

)^?'^"a^'£>^

My Commission Expires:
tio&V Publico Q<\>:,y.-.-,,,

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy gf the above and
foregoing was mailed postage prepaid, this

-6-
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day

/«'£<

of March, 1990, to:
John Michael Coombs
Attorney for Plaintiff
72 East 400 South, Suite 220
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Blake T. Ostler
KIRTON & MCCONKIE
Attorneys for Defendant Fletcher
330 South Third East
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Larry G. Reed
PARSONS 8c CROWTHER
Attorneys for Atlas Stock Transfer Corp.
455 South 300 East, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Philip R. Hughes, Esq.
Attorney for Check Rite
844 South 200 East, #100
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

c
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Ti.- o' J.».:•'.:& District
JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS, No. 3639
Attorney for Plaintiff
72 East 400 South, Suite 220
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone No.: (801) 359-0833

/~~.

UUN. 6 1990

3/:
' i^jiny Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH

LeANNA BROADWATER,
JUDGMENT AND ORDER
Plaintiff,
v.
OLD REPUBLIC SURETY, a Wisconsin
corporation doing business in
Utah. NORTHWESTERN NATIONAL
INSURANCE COMPANY OF MILWAUKEE,
WISCONSIN, a Wisconsin
corporation, doing business in
Utah. ATLAS STOCK TRANSFER, a
Utah Corporation, CHECK RITE
INTERNATIONAL INC., f/k/a
CARDINAL ENERGY CORPORATION, a
Utah corporation, and SCOTT J.
FLETCHER, a Utah resident,

Civil No. 89-0902684-CV
Judge Raymond S. Uno

Defendants.

The Court having reviewed the file, having heard oral argument on May 1. 1990,
including the memorandums and affidavits filed in support of and in opposition to several
motions, the Court being fully advised and good cause further appearing, hereby enters
judgment and further orders as follows:
1. Defendants' motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's first and second
causes of action is denied.
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2. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on Counts I and II of her amended
complaint is granted and judgment is hereby entered in favor of plaintiff and against
defendants Atlas Stock Transfer and Check Rite International, Inc., in the amount of
$10,500.00 with interest thereon at 10% per annum since July 31, 1988. Pursuant to Rule
54(d)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure plaintiff is hereby awarded costs. Further,
pursuant to §15-1-4, Utah Code Ann., interest shall accrue on this judgment from the date
of its entry at the rate of 12% per annum. The matter of plaintiff's attorney's fees is taken
under advisement and will be ruled upon after the submission of a detailed affidavit in
support of such an award.
3. Defendants Old Republic Surety and Northwestern National's motion for an
order striking the affidavits of plaintiff, Chuck Burton, Potter Investment Company, and
Penny Grace is denied.
4. Defendant Old Republic Surety and Northwestern National's motion to strike
certain portions of plaintiff's memorandum in opposition to defendants' motion for partial
summary judgment and plaintiff's memorandum in support of her motion for partial
summary judgment is granted.
5. Defendants Old Republic Surety and Northwestern National's motion for
summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's third, fourth, and fifth causes of action in her
amended complaint as against them is granted, but any award of attorney's fees is denied.
6. Plaintiff's motion for sanctions against the insurance company defendants
and their counsel is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED.
DATED this t

u

day of June, 1990.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In re:

Broadwater v. Old Republic Surety, et al.
Civil No. 89-0902684-CV
JUDGMENT AND ORDER

Third District Cour

Judge Raymond S. Uno '

0200:JUDG.l
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Third Ju,j ...

JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS. No. 3639
Attorney for Plaintiff
72 East 400 South, Suite 220
Salt Lake City. Utah 84111
Telephone No.: (801) 359-0833

t->:S:riC(

SEP 1 7 13S0

PofAjiy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL.DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH

JUDGMENT FOR ATTORNEY'S
FEES

LeANNA BROADWATER.
Plaintiff.

OLD REPUBLIC SURETY, a Wisconsin
corporation doing business in
Utah, NORTH WESTERN NATIONAL
INSURANCE COMPANY OF MILWAUKEE,
WISCONSIN, a Wisconsin
corporation, doing business in
Utah, ATLAS STOCK TRANSFER, a
Utah Corporation. CHECK RITE
INTERNATIONAL INC., f/k/a
CARDINAL ENERGY CORPORATION, a
Utah corporation, and SCOTT J.
FLETCHER, a Utah resident,

Civil No. 89-0902684-CV
Judge Raymond S. Uno

Defendants.

A hearing having been held in the above-entitled Court on September 6, 1990,
at the hour of 9:30 a.m., on the issue of attorney's fees; John Michael Coombs having
appeared for plaintiff Broadwater; Stephen J. Trayner having appeared on behalf of
defendants Old Republic Surety and Northwestern National Insurance Company of
Milwaukee, Wisconsin; Larry G. Reed having appeared for defendant Atlas Stock Transfer;
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no appearance having been made by defendant Check Rite International, Inc., in that its
A
Local
, \ C r
tf|0$
local counsel claims to have had no notice of the hearing citJdtiCOUrS&y
^o\r
\ i
C K e c k R;V-d U)C\s> Uot
rjv/cluciflflf ^ w + k t rtl^i MNa C l f i / 1 i \ * c 4 r ^ The Court having heard the arguments of counsel and read the affidavits and
memorandums on file; it having also heard the parties' oral stipulation that plaintiff is bound
by the terms of her contingency fee arrangement with her counsel, and, in that regard, the
Court having further acknowledged that plaintiff has a one-third (1 /3)/two-thirds (2/3's)
contingency tee arrangement witn her counsel, as set form in Exnibit "A" attached hereto
and incorporated by reference, and good cause further appearing, the Court ruled as
follows:
Plaintiff LeAnna Broadwater is hereby awarded a judgment against defendants
Atlas Stock Transfer and Check Rite International, Inc., for attorney's fees in the amount of
one-third (1 /3) of the amount of the judgment entered against such defendants on June 6,
1990, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto and incorporated into this
judgment by reference as Exhibit "B".
DATED t h i s / 2 3a7of September, 1990.

THIRD DISTRICT COUR1

Third District Judge'Raymond S. Uno
Approved as to form:

PM>fi. L

Philip R. Hughes
/
Counsel to Check Rite International, Inc.
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March 22, 1989

Mr. John Michael Coombs, Lawyer
72 East 400 South, Suite 220
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Dear Michael:
I have searched my telephone records and, apparently, have given
you all the information on calls I made to Guardalabene.
I have recieved the most recent offer and find it absolutely ridiculous. As you will note, in previous correspondence I sent to
Guardalabene, dated July 11th, he had proposed over the phone to
pay me the amount I had paid for the stock for settlement, which
was $2,480, and I flatly refused and asked that he just simply replace the stock and allow me to sell it at whatever price I chose.
That is why I am so adamant about their paying me the highest price
the stock traded at plus punitive damages or attorneys fees because
of their unwillingness to settle the matter with me at that time.
I'm not sure we want to go into such detail with Fletcher, but you're
the expert and I will leave that decision up to you. You had mentioned previously about asking for a Summary Judgment. What is your
thinking on that now?
Below I have outlined our agreement the way I believe we discussed
it. If it is satisfactory to you, please make a copy, sign it and
return for my files.
I have previously submitted a $1,500 retainer to you which is to
be deducted from your total fees.
It is agreed that you are entitled to one third of whatever is recovered. However, it is further agreed that if it is necessary to
go to trial then you will be entitled to half of whatever is recovered. Except if punitive damages are awarded, I will be entitled
to the first $8,000 of whatever is awarded and then we will split
the remainder on a 50/50 basis.
Sinperely,
^7^-&rLs<S

LeAnna (Broadwater) Robbins
lr
AGREED AND ACCEPTED THIS
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Third J..«.1»'.:ial District
JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS. No. 3639
Attorney for Plaintiff
72 East 400 South, Suite 220
Salt Lake City. Utah 84111
Telephone No.: (801) 359-0833

^
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH

LeANNA BROADWATER.
JUDGMENT AND ORDER
Plaintiff.

OLD REPUBLIC SURETY, a Wisconsin
corporation doing business in
Utah. NORTHWESTERN NATIONAL
INSURANCE COMPANY OF MILWAUKEE.
WISCONSIN, a Wisconsin
corporation, doing business in
Utah. ATLAS STOCK TRANSFER, a
Utah Corporation. CHECK RITE
INTERNATIONAL INC., f/k/a
CARDINAL ENERGY CORPORATION, a
Utah corporation, and SCOTT J.
FLETCHER, a Utah resident.

Civil No. 89-0902684-CV
Judge Raymond S. Uno

Defendants.
The Court having reviewed the file, having heard oral argument on May 1. 1990.
including the memorandums and affidavits filed in support of and in opposition to several
motions, the Court being fully advised and good cause further appearing, hereby enters
Judgment and further orders as follows:
1. Defendants* motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's first and second
causes of action is denied.
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2. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on Counts I and II of her amended
complaint is granted and judgment is hereby entered in favor of plaintiff and against
defendants Atlas Stock Transfer and Check Rite International, Inc., in the amount of
$10,500.00 with interest thereon at 10% per annum since July 31, 1988. Pursuant to Rule
54(d)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure plaintiff is hereby awarded costs. Further,
pursuant to §15-1-4, Utah Code Ann., interest shall accrue on this judgment from the date
of its entry at the rate of 12% per annum. The matter of plaintiff's attorney's fees is taken
under advisement and will be ruled upon after the submission of a detailed affidavit in
support of such an award.
3. Defendants Old Republic Surety and Northwestern National's motion for an
order striking the affidavits of plaintiff. Chuck Burton, Potter Investment Company, and
Penny Grace is denied.
4. Defendant Old Republic Surety and Northwestern National's motion to strike
certain portions of plaintiff's memorandum in opposition to defendants' motion for partial
summary judgment and plaintiff's memorandum in support of her motion for partial
summary judgment is granted.
5. Defendants Old Republic Surety and Northwestern National's motion for
summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's third, fourth, and fifth causes of action in her
amended complaint as against them is granted, but any award of attorney's fees is denied.
6. Plaintiff's motion for sanctions against the insurance company defendants
and their counsel is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED.
DATED this &®

day of June. 1990.
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In re:

Broadwater v. Old Republic Surety, et al.
Civil No. 89-0902684-CV
JUDGMENT AND ORDER

Third District Court

^^^X^A^-

Judge Raymond S. Uno

D O C l ' . " " 't C;: RLE \\-\ 7K1£ 7 1 ' . .
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OCT 1 9 1990

Larry G. Reed - 2709
Crowther & Reed
Attorneys for Atlas Stock Transfer
455 South 300 East, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-9865

L V*--> vJuh

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
LeANNA BROADWATER,
Plaintiff,

ORDER GRANTING AMENDED
RULE 54(b) MOTION TO
CERTIFY JUDGMENTS AS
FINAL

vs.
OLD REPUBLIC SURETY, a Wisconsin
corporation doing business in
Utah, NORTH WESTERN NATIONAL
INSURANCE COMPANY OF MILWAUKEE
WISCONSIN, a Wisconsin corporation, doing business in Utah,
ATLAS STOCK TRANSFER, a Utah
Corporation, CHECK RITE INTERNATIONAL, INC. f/k/a CARDINAL
ENERGY CORPORATION, a Utah
corporation, and SCOTT J. FLETCHER,
a Utah resident,

Civil No. 89-0902684-CV
Honorable Raymond S. Uno

Defendants.
The Motion of defendants Atlas Stock Transfer

Corp., Old

Republic Surety, North Western National Insurance Company and Check
Rite International, Inc. to Certify Judgment as final pursuant to
Rule 54(b), Utah

Rules

of

Civil

Procedure,

having come on for

decision before the above entitled Court on October 18, 1990, the
Honorable

Raymond

S.

Uno,

presiding,

and

plaintiff

1
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appearing

through counsel, J, Michael Coombs, defendant Atlas Stock Transfer
Corp. appearing through counsel, Larry G. Reed, defendants Old
Republic

Surety

and

North

Western

National

Insurance

Company

appearing through counsel, Stephen J, Trayner, and defendant Check
Rite International through counsel, Phillip R. Hughes, and the
Court having reviewed the Memoranda supporting and opposing said
Motion

and

having

heard

the arguments

and

representations

of

counsel, and it appearing to the Court that multiple claims for
relief have been presented in this action, that the Judgments dated
June 6 and September 17, 1990 would be appealable but for the fact
that other claims and parties remain in this action, and that there
is no just reason for delay and further that the decision set forth
in this Court's Memorandum Decision, dated May 24, 1990, constitutes a final determination of plaintiff's claims as set forth
in Counts

I and

II

of

her Amended

Complaint

and

good

cause

appearing therefor;
THE
entered

COURT
by

HEREBY

this

Court

ORDERS

and

on June

certifies

6,

1990

and

that
the

the

Judgment

Judgment

for

Attorney's Fees, entered on September 17, 1990, are both final and
appealable within the meaning of Rule 54 (b), Utah Rules

of

Civil

Procedure.
DATED this / /

day of October, 1990.

fr

/y

Honorable Raymond S. Uno
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J. JMicml^ei^obin&s
Attorney for Plaintiff

Attorney for Old Republic Surety
and North Western National Insurance

UMAJJ^

PhilTir^'R/ Hughes
Attorney for Check/^ite I n t e r n a t i o n a l , Inc.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the above and
foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid, this / / day of October,
1990, to:
J. Michael Coombs
Attorney for Plaintiff
72 East 400 South, Suite 220
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Blake T. Ostler
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN
Attorneys for Defendant Fletcher
60 East South Temple, Suite 1800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Phillip R. Hughes
Attorney for Check Rite International, Inc.
844 South 200 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Stephen J. Trayner
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Old Republic Surety
9 Exchange Place, #600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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